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Reviewed by Thomas Stanton and Anthony Lang, this thesis explores the important 
question of how a combination of security intelligence and risk management could be used to 
address insider threats and their impact on national security. As the thesis documents, insiders 
threaten not only the wellbeing of employees and facilities, but also the confidentiality and 
integrity of sensitive information, which could be used by foreign adversaries of the United 
States. The first chapter recommends more systematic integration of intelligence information into 
security programs. The second chapter explores the role of risk management, and especially 
Enterprise Risk Management, in improving the effectiveness of federal security programs and 
organizations. The third chapter focuses directly on the problem of insider threats. It highlights 
the remarkable number of ways that insiders such as Edward Snowden displayed warning signs 
of the danger they posed to national security, long before the damage they caused occurred. 
It was discovered that analyzing current threat information, which makes it intelligence, 
enables security programs to allocate resources and deploy countermeasures more appropriately. 
The intelligence findings enable risk management, which is the ongoing process federal 
organizations use to determine how they will respond to threats. Organizations that fail to 
understand their threat, and subsequently impose risk-driven countermeasures, are likely to 
suffer consequences from attacks – many of which come from insider threats. Insiders acting 
against federal organizations stand to damage national security by harming people they work 
with, revealing defense secrets, and/or weakening international relations. The potential damage 
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Insider threats consistently prove to be an evolving challenge for U.S. national security. 
The concept of a trusted employee using their privileged access to classified secrets for harm is 
difficult to fathom for many of the dedicated professionals in public service. Yet, the threat 
persists through both the cyber and physical domains. The rapid development of technology 
coupled with any insider’s legitimate access makes them exceptionally difficult to discover. To 
effectively mitigate the risk posed by insider threats, risk management and intelligence analysis 
must be intertwined in the foundation federal security programs are built upon. Security 
programs charged with protecting defense organizations that fail to integrate those ancillary 
considerations jeopardize national security, with consequences ranging between lost American 
lives, global economic implications, and geopolitical standing. This thesis examines insider 
threats and federal security programs in the broader context of utilizing security intelligence and 
risk management for improved protection and safeguarding of national security. 
The first chapter explores how federal security programs benefit from integrating with 
intelligence analysis, creating a subdiscipline known as security intelligence. It was found that 
analyzing current threat information, which makes it intelligence, enables security programs to 
allocate resources and deploy countermeasures more effectively. However, varying authorities 
between executive departments creates collection challenges for organizations within the 
Department of Defense (DoD). The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security are 
authorized to passively collect intelligence on U.S. persons, but the DoD is not due to their 
wartime mission, making their focus more on foreign intelligence targets. This dichotomy of 
authorities makes interagency cooperation imperative for defending against the predominately 
 
 
domestic nature of insider threats to national security. Yet, case studies illustrate how each 
department’s varying mission puts them at odds for sharing threat information; the undulation 
between prosecution and collection priorities rages on between executive departments.  
The second chapter explores how risk management works with federal security programs. 
Enterprise Risk Management is a term often used in organizations for financial decision making, 
but how it pertains to security operations and program management was the focus. The process 
of analyzing threats, vulnerabilities, and potential impact to determine overall ‘risk’ is directly 
applicable and necessary for security programs to be effective. Exploratory research determined 
there are many executive mandates that require federal organizations to implement risk 
management practices throughout their workforces. Yet, there is little information on its specific 
application in daily security practices, making it seem unlikely that individual security officers 
are aware of the larger risk management strategy. This is an area where additional research may 
yield more detailed discoveries and opportunities for improvement; albeit, the concept proves 
how security programs must remain flexible and can benefit from implementing the various 
stages of risk management to adapt their activities to the assessed needs.  
The final chapter is a deep dive into what insider threats are and how they impact national 
security, before tying the entire thesis portfolio together by introducing risk management and 
security intelligence into the scenario. The research question of ‘how insider threats impact 
national security’ drove the chapter’s research. It begins by first framing what an insider threat 
really is, using nationally accepted definitions. After providing a solid foundation and definition 
of what an insider threat really means, exactly how they stand to damage national security is 
illustrated using real world ramifications as examples. Most notably, insiders can cost American 
 
 
lives by disclosing secrets to U.S. adversaries pertaining to the defenses they may encounter, the 
sources and methods used to collect intelligence, and sabotaging international relations.  
The case studies of Nidal Hasan and Edward Snowden are used to illustrate the nature 
and varying consequences associated with insider threats – violence and espionage. The 
Snowden case study is then used to tie the entire portfolio together by illuminating how his 
attack on national security may have been mitigated with better risk management and 
intelligence. There were many early indications and warning signs that Snowden was a risk, who 
could eventually manifest into an insider threat. Yet, many were dismissed and not investigated 
to the extent that could have prevented his attack and the subsequent damage he caused, 
illustrating security failures. As a result, risk management changed dramatically at the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and that evidence is presented.   
The author of this thesis works in the security field and used firsthand observations with 
empirical analysis to guide the research. Exploratory research was the primary method for 
determining the relationships between risk management, intelligence, and analysis. However, 
four expert interviews were also conducted with members responsible for security within the 
intelligence community and a subject matter expert in risk management from Carnegie Mellon 
University.  The sources used in this thesis ranged from primary to tertiary literature. The 
primary literature proved to be invaluable case studies conducted by the agencies that responded 
to some of the tragic events. Furthermore, the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Chief Risk 
Officer, who was appointed after the Snowden attack, was interviewed several times, and 
provided significant insight to the process they went through. Additionally, guidelines, manuals, 
executive orders, and doctrines were used as primary sources.  
 
 
Some necessary research was impossible to acquire given the nature of it being classified 
and this being an unclassified process. For example, there was a report generated by Congress 
that literally outlined the exact damage Snowden’s attack had on national security, which was 
one of the main points of the thesis. Unfortunately, that report was classified as Top Secret and 
therefore could not be found on the open internet or be used in this study. As a result, redacted 
versions released through the Freedom of Information Act and other unclassified documents 
were used to piece together the likely impact. There was also a lack of strong sources detailing 
the specifics of risk management influences every day security practices. This may be for good 
reason – they do not want to publish everyday security practices that would give an advantage to 
adversaries seeking to thwart them. Yet, the tactical effects of how risk management is used by 
security officers is still unclear; so, this thesis speaks more to the strategic benefits.  
Security programs are complex as they include responsibilities in both the physical and 
information domains. Yet they differ between the federal and private sectors as those 
organizations are typically revenue oriented and the government is not. Plus, the threat landscape 
differs by the motivations of the attackers. Attackers in the private sector often share their 
victim’s motivation, which is money. Whereas, those who attack the government are more likely 
motivated by political or strategic incentives, such as intelligence collection or sabotaging U.S. 
interests. Regardless, of the sector or attackers’ motivations, security programs are tasked with 
protecting their organization’s people, places, and information; an increasingly difficult task 
today with the advancements in cyber. Yet, security is always an overhead expense and, 
therefore, under constant scrutiny, making efficacy extremely important.  
Security programs in federal organizations are often broken down into three categories: 
information (aka cyber), physical, and personnel. Information security is responsible for 
 
 
safeguarding the organization’s information, be it written or printed on physical material or in 
cyberspace. Physical security is often the most recognizable; it often includes the organization’s 
uniformed security officers, security systems, and access control countermeasures. Personnel 
security is often less noticeable to the untrained eye, but includes all the administrative tasks 
associated with processing and granting security clearances. Personnel security in the federal 
sector is crucial as there are varying degrees of ‘need to know,’ which determines clearance 
levels, security caveats, and prevents accidental ‘spillage’ incidents.  
Given the three distinct branches of security that make up federal security programs, 
there are unique personnel working in each, different leadership, and different goals, which 
ultimately creates a silo effect. The different cultures throughout the branches impacts the overall 
effectiveness as there is often a lack of understanding amongst those tasked with achieving the 
same goal. This is important because attackers have recognized the seams between departments 
and have recently began exploiting the subsequent vulnerabilities. Many of these attacks are 
known as ‘social engineering,’ which a finely tuned security program should be capable of 
preventing. Communication between the various security programs and senior leadership is 
imperative, but the security program’s strategy must ultimately be rooted in risk management.  
How can a security program accurately assign, train, or equip its personnel without 
having a thorough understanding of the threats it may face? The answer is that it cannot; it needs 
intelligence collection and analysis to accurately capture the threat data. Once the threat data is 
understood, risk management can be used to accurately allocate resources according to the 
unique needs. First, senior leadership provides the organization’s risk appetite, which serves as 
the benchmark for practitioners to plan against. The analysis of the threat data combined with 
internal vulnerabilities and the impact of a breach is what determines the overall risk. When the 
 
 
actual risk expands beyond the risk appetite, the security program is meant to reduce the risk to 
an acceptable level through its many safeguards and countermeasures.  
Seeing how intelligence enables risk management and risk management drives security 
operations, the practical application of this model should be extremely important to senior 
leaders. Once established, the cycle is fluid and changes based on the threat landscape, which 
intelligence will indicate. Then risk management can determine the correct balance of safeguards 
with acceptable loss and security can execute accordingly. Since the security programs discussed 
are tasked with protecting the organizations that are charged with protecting America, ensuring 
they operate effectively is paramount to national security. Afterall, a poorly handled security 
event, or oversight, could lead to a situation such as Edward Snowden, Nidal Hasan, or Aaron 
Alexis. Yet, a failure of security calls into question the effectiveness of the risk management 
process as well because it is possible the security program was not resourced properly or failed to 
capture requisite intelligence.  
Chapter 1: Security Intelligence  
 
Achieving a state of safety and security is the second level of Maslow’s hierarchy of 
basic needs. It is human instinct to constantly limit risk and attain a state of security, which is to 
be free from danger or threat. Yet, it is the nature of virtually any threat to adapt and overcome 
obstacles preventing it from achieving its objectives. Federal site security programs are 
susceptible to attacks in both the physical and information domains, which jeopardizes national 
security by impacting their operations. Currently, federal approaches to security are 
decentralized, relying on disconnected organizations and departments to prevent and see any 
incident through. Threat actors can exploit this seam in security coverage by using a blend of 
 
 
physical and cyber activities to execute their attacks in each domain. Integrating intelligence 
collection and analysis into security plans may eliminate the vulnerabilities and security 
oversights that a non-holistic security program would miss, while also decreasing response times.  
The constant undulation between security and risk drastically evolved in the 1980s with 
the invention of the World Wide Web. Unchecked technology that evolved faster than the 
average citizen or employees (the entities needing protection) could mitigate. There is a lack of 
awareness and a sense that the average internet user is a passive recipient of all the internet has to 
offer, negative and positive, creating a new set of threats and subsequent risk. For this reason, it 
is more important than ever to design cost effective security programs that account for more than 
the traditional ‘guards, gates, and guns’ as seen in most disparate security programs used by the 
federal government. Security programs must protect against numerous physical threats, like 
active shooters, whilst also maintaining the ability to prevent adversaries from obtaining 
sensitive classified information or sabotaging operations in the cyber domain. A security 
program’s countermeasures should be determined by a robust risk management cycle, which 
benefits if driven by intelligence analysis. Detailing the advantages of fusing intelligence and 
security into one holistic security program federal agencies is the objective of this thesis.  
As the threat landscape expanded in breadth and depth, many policies changed and 
standards were established by the highest offices in the federal government to compensate; 
examples are changes in national policy by every administration since President Clinton, the 
minimum standards set by the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF), and executive orders 
10450, 12333 and 12968. However, the seam between physical security and cyber security 
continues to be a vulnerability due to cyber security’s relatively infantile stage of life (compared 
 
 
to physical) and the continued trial and error of fusing the two disciplines into a harmonious 
security program.  
Most security programs are designed with the assumption that a dedicated attacker will 
not be thwarted by a single layer of security, so numerous protective countermeasures are 
implemented to secure the innermost assets of the facility. However, the funding and specific 
countermeasures are commensurate of the risk levels, which can only be determined through 
intelligence collection and analysis. Risk-informed analysis enables the agency to allocate 
appropriate funding and resources to meet their needs. The fusion of both creates a symbiotic 
program capable of offering better protection and reducing costs.  
Effective security is required at any federal agency and cleared defense contractor (CDC) 
with federal equities. It also accounts for the added risk of Sensitive Compartmented Information 
Facilities (SCIFs), where classified information is processed. The agencies who use intelligence 
to drive security will be referred to as ‘customers’ because understanding that security is a 
customer-centric function is imperative to its success. The difference between this kind of 
customer service and the meaning in a traditional sense is that it is inward facing and is a 
mentality, not just a business practice used to garner revenue.  
Based on the current vulnerabilities of the techno-landscape, best practices implementing 
holistic security programs should be the norm for industry protection throughout the federal 
government; however, this is not the case. Countless attacks and attempts to collect information 
on federal and CDC customers prove the need for evolution in security practices. Discovered 
attacks encompass a wide array of threats, from physical breaches to remote hacking. Some 
intend to steal valuable classified information, while others seek to achieve loss of life. A holistic 
 
 
security program will minimize risk by accounting for all threats and better preparing the 
organization to deal with any attack or breach in the most timely and pragmatic way possible.  
History of Security Failures 
 
Timothy McVeigh, a U.S. Army Veteran, was responsible for killing 168 people in the 
Oklahoma City bombing against the Murrah Federal Building in 1995. His anti-government 
ideology served as motivation for his attack; his hatred was exacerbated by the Waco siege and 
the Ruby Ridge standoff.1 After a short reconnaissance of targets, McVeigh recognized a 
vulnerability in the Federal Building’s access control security that would enable him to drive a 
vehicle born improvised explosive device close enough to the building that a detonation would 
create mass causalities. Since McVeigh was not an insider, his presence at the federal facility was 
an indicator of malign intent and is likely the reason he could not get the bomb inside the internal 
parking garage, which would have caused additional damage. Yet, his plan worked as the 
explosion seared off approximately a third of the building, killing men, women, and children 
inside.  
If the Murrah building’s security was more effectively planned and managed, McVeigh 
would not have been able to drive the truck close enough to create such a catastrophe. It is likely 
that if the threat landscape was ever assessed for the building, it was a static assessment and not 
continually considered, which is problematic because threats evolve with real world events, like 
Ruby Ridge and Waco. Additionally, who made the decision that entrance bollards were not 
worth the investment or necessary? There is no information on that logic blunder, but the 
conversation may have only occurred by the original building architects and the property 
 
1 Gumbel, A. Oklahoma City bombing: 20 years later, key questions remain unanswered. April 13, 2015 
 
 
management personnel, certainly not security or risk management experts. A fused approach to 
security would have included ongoing intelligence analysis of the threat landscape, which would 
have likely prompted the need for additional countermeasures such as bollards. This attack also 
set a new benchmark for risk analysis on federal facilities and created lessons learned that 
prompted the FBI to create 56 standalone field offices.   
An example of an attack by a foreign intelligence entity was Ana Montes, a Cuban spy, 
who was driven by different intentions than McVeigh. Montes was recruited to spy for the Cuban 
government in 1984 while she was working for the Department of Justice, but at the time she did 
not have a job that provided access to useful intelligence.2 Shortly after being recruited, she 
applied to and was accepted for a job with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), where she 
worked at the U.S. Southern Command in Florida. Her work in the Intelligence Directorate (J2) 
provided regular access to vast amounts of intelligence that she passed covertly to her Cuban 
handlers. She was also able to influence the U.S. Intelligence Community’s efforts and findings 
against Cuba during her time working for them, which is a national security crime known as 
sabotage. Montes was eventually caught and sentenced for her crimes, but grave damage had 
already occurred due to her ability to steal classified information and pass it on to a foreign 
adversary while remaining undetected for so long. Despite many indicators of her activities, 
Montes was also able to pass the DIA’s polygraph through specialized techniques she was taught 
by her Cuban handlers; exemplifying the value in applying intelligence to the security programs 
tasked with preventing such deception.  
Robert Hanssen, an FBI agent, caused one of the worst intelligence disasters in history by 
providing the KGB classified information from within throughout the cold war. While remaining 
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anonymous the entire time he spied for the Russians, Hanssen’s efforts caused the execution of 
numerous KGB assets working for the FBI. Additionally, he informed the Russians of the FBI’s 
collection efforts on the Soviet Embassy in Washington, which cost millions of dollars. Hanssen 
was regarded as only a mediocre Agent throughout his employment at the FBI and was known to 
have poor social skills. During his time as an FBI agent, he was never expected of being a spy, 
rarely encountered security checks, never took a polygraph, and was never asked to submit a 
financial disclosure statement, which equated to numerous security failures.3  
At the same time Hanssen was spying, Aldrich Ames was also serving as a double agent 
for the KGB. Ames worked for the CIA for 31 years in counterintelligence, which is the 
discipline of intelligence meant to prevent foreign espionage. His work was also focused on 
Soviet counterintelligence, most notably the KGB and GRU, which is who recruited him to 
betray his country. Ames was a heavy drinker of alcohol and had marriage problems. During an 
assignment in Mexico, Ames had at least three extramarital affairs, one of which was with a CIA 
informant. Romantic affiliations with confidential informants are strictly forbidden by CIA 
policy, but he kept it a secret. He eventually divorced his wife and incurred a significant financial 
hardship as a result of their split. It is suspected that Ames began spying for the Russians as a 
result of his financial troubles, yet all the indicators of the potential were present long before 
given his risky behavior and poor moral code of conduct.4 Even though he worked in 
counterintelligence, a holistic security program would have ensured he was investigated solely 
based on the many indicators he displayed.  
 
3 Office of the Inspector General. A Review of the FBI's Performance in Deterring, Detecting, and Investigating the 
Espionage Activities of Robert Philip Hanssen. (2003, August 14). 
4 Department of State. An Assessment of the Aldrich H. Ames Espionage Case and Its Implications for U.S. Intelligence. 
(1994, November 01). 
 
 
In recent history, Edward Snowden achieved notoriety for breaching intelligence 
oversight by releasing hundreds of thousands to potentially a million secret documents to the 
global media. Unfortunately, his betrayal damaged U.S. relations with many foreign allies and 
compromised an undisclosed amount of intelligence operations, costing the U.S. taxpayers and 
Intelligence Community more than it helped. His rapidly changing ideology, while still 
employed, was a strong indicator of his eventual actions, yet it was not investigated and the 
damage was inevitable. Snowden was granted administrative privileges on the NSA’s network, 
which enabled him to view any file without restriction or suspicion. Additionally, there were few, 
if any, internal audits conducted of who viewed what and the antiquated IT systems allowed him 
to use thumb drives to steal the data he wanted. While most employees are strictly forbidden to 
use thumb drives, or any portable electronic devices (PEDs), his administrator status provided 
him plausible deniability because he could have claimed he was using a thumb drive for a 
legitimate purpose as part of his responsibilities.5  
Snowden was a valued employee during his tenure, but became a dangerous insider threat 
who weakened national security as a result of his betrayal. However, a potentially even more 
deadly threat was Harold Martin III, who was also a contractor at NSA and stole approximately 
50 terabytes of NSA’s highly classified information and cyber weapons.6 Martin differed from 
Snowden because he intended to sell his stolen property on the dark web to an organization such 
as the Shadow Brokers, who have released NSA’s stolen cyber weapons in the past. The Shadow 
Brokers are an anonymous organization, or individual, who seemingly exists only to sell top 
secret cyber weapons and exploits that cybercriminals may use to hack banks, government 
networks, or even give an advantage to a competing government. Since the Shadow Brokers 
 
5 Cole, M., & Esposito, R. How Snowden did it. (2013, August 23). 
6 Farivar, C. Feds seized 50TB of data from NSA contractor suspected of theft. (2016, October 20). 
 
 
seem to favor attacking the NSA, it is possible they have someone employed at the NSA who 
provides expert insight.  
A similar cyber-attack occurred against the FBI in April 2019. Attackers hacked over 
1,000 websites to steal information off FBI servers. The data they gathered is sensitive 
information regarding personal details about federal government employees and cases. The 
information was posted for sale on the dark web.7 This attack places everyone who had 
information stolen at grave risk given the type of people or organizations who would be 
interested in buying that sort of information. Section III of the DOJ’s Order 0904 indicates 
negligence on the FBI’s network security personnel since the attacks were made possible due to 
untimely security upgrades.8 
While it is unclear, or not public knowledge, who is behind the FBI attack, it was most 
likely an organization like the Shadow brokers and not state sponsored. However, other cyber 
threat actors include nation states, such as Iran, China, and Russia. The Russians are widely 
believed to have conducted cyber-attacks during the 2016 Presidential election, but more 
sophisticated attacks constantly occur to undermine the U.S.’ national security efforts. All 
malicious cyber actors are believed to pose a significant threat to the U.S., based on the National 
Security Strategy of 2017. The strategic document even includes cyber-space when discussing 
the importance of securing borders, which proves the severity and breadth of the threat. Securing 
the borders, or perimeter, of a potential target is essential in any security plan and is the first step 
in the holistic security program.  
 
7 Whittaker, Z. Hackers publish personal data on thousands of US police officers and federal agents – TechCrunch. 
(2019, April 13). 
8 Department of Justice Order Cyber Security Program, 0904. (2016). 
 
 
Intelligence Drives Security Operations 
 
Security programs are most effective when the customer fully understands their 
environment and the potential threats through enhanced situational awareness. If a customer has 
no threat, why would they need security? A correct understanding of threats leads to accurate risk 
analysis, which enables decision-makers to allocate resources and adjust the security posture 
accordingly. The best way to articulate a threat landscape is through security intelligence, which 
uses a combination of all source analysis and counterintelligence operations. Security 
intelligence is the first element of the holistic security program as it is used to communicate 
useful threat data, both internal and external to the organization. It is defined by the Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, 2005, as “intelligence on the identity, capability, and intentions 
of hostile organizations or individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, or 
terrorism.” Security intelligence differs slightly than common intelligence used for national 
security. The Central Intelligence Agency defines Intelligence analysis as “the application of 
individual and collective cognitive methods to weigh data and test hypotheses within a secret 
socio-cultural context.”9  
The ultimate objective of all intelligence should always be security. Yet, there is a 
distinguishable difference in the way it is conducted by security programs or for national security 
purposes. For national security, international intelligence operations have tactical, operational, 
and strategic benefits, meant for a vast array of recipients ranging from Soldiers in a war zone to 
the President of the United States. National intelligence also includes powerful information 
collection assets that are owned and tasked by many different Intelligence / Combat Support 
Agencies (CSA), all representing a primary intelligence discipline. Before national level 
 
9 Central Intelligence Agency Library. (2008, June 28). 
 
 
intelligence products are published, they undergo a lengthy review and approval process. 
However, domestic security intelligence products do not endure the same scrutiny since they are 
not meant for widespread publication outside of security personnel. Any intelligence provided to 
security programs often includes relevant threat information used to determine risk levels for 
internal decision makers who must act based on that information. In the event an intelligence 
product would add value to the IC, the analysts coordinate with the customer’s intelligence 
directorate to comply with their publication process and release authority. However, most 
intelligence used by security personnel is derived from finished intelligence already published by 
the intelligence community, most specifically the DoJ and DHS given restrictions on DoD’s 
ability to collect on US persons.  
1.1 National Intelligence Disciplines 
The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) leads the DoD’s efforts in 
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), which can be characterized as the IC’s eyes. This discipline 
involves sophisticated imagery collection assets that captures photos and videos on areas of 
interest. The collection platforms include Unmanned Aerial Systems and satellites that are built, 
flown, and maintained by the National Reconnaissance Office.10 The NGA’s contributions to the 
Global War on Terror led to an exact replica of Osama bin Laden’s compound for SEAL Team 
6’s rehearsals before the raid and has also correctly predicted where insurgents may have 
conducted IED strikes in Iraq.11 GEOINT could be applied to security programs by planning the 
best egress/ingress routes for first responders, or determining the most likely avenues of 
approach for aggressors.  
 
10 National Reconnaissance Office. About The NRO. (N.d.) 




The National Security Agency is the leader in Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), and serves as 
the IC’s ears. Like most Combat Support Agencies, the NSA’s existence was classified for a long 
time before becoming public knowledge. The acronym ‘NSA’ was satirically referred to as 
meaning ‘No Such Agency’ instead of its actual meaning because of how seriously its employees 
took operational security. However, all their efforts pertain to some form of an electronic signal 
and can involve communications systems, weapons, and radars used by adversaries. The NSA is 
tasked with eavesdropping and making/breaking codes in order to defeat the U.S.’ national 
security threats.12 They are also the leader in the defense of the cyber domain, where they protect 
the U.S.’ cyber assets. Their application to a security program could come from intercepting a 
message about a pending attack on a government agency or CDC. Knowing about a potential 
attack beforehand would enable the agency to better prepare or thwart it.  
The Central Intelligence Agency is an independent organization and their official mission 
is to “collect, analyze, evaluate, and disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the President and 
senior US government policymakers in making decisions relating to national security”.13 While it 
is likely they use multiple disciplines of intelligence, the CIA is widely known to be the premier 
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) agency. They are capable of clandestinely acquiring 
photographs, documents and conducting overt collection overseas. They also maintain official 
contacts with foreign governments and debrief foreign nationals in addition to U.S. citizens who 
travel overseas.14 Regardless of how they fuse intelligence disciplines, their ability to interact 
with people for the collection of intelligence is what makes them different from the 
aforementioned agencies and disciplines. Since it is not within the CIA’s jurisdiction to collect on 
 
12 National Security Agency. What We Do. (N.d.) 




U.S. citizens, they may intercept and pass information to the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) or DHS regarding a potential terror attack on a federal agency.  
The Department of Justice’s FBI is the U.S.’ premier law enforcement agency that does 
have the jurisdiction to collect on U.S. citizens for the sake of investigations. The FBI is unlike 
the previously mentioned agencies as they do not specialize in a specific intelligence discipline 
and are primarily focused on federal investigations. The FBI has primary investigative 
responsibility on anything with a nexus to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
This is significant because any local police department or another agency may discover leads that 
must be turned over to the FBI for investigation. Their investigations revolve around terrorism, 
counterintelligence, cybercrime, public corruption, civil rights, organized crime, white collar 
crime, violent crime, and WMDs. The FBI is known to be very good at counterintelligence, 
which is extremely crucial in security and a critical intelligence discipline in the security.  
1.2 Security Intelligence 
National intelligence focuses on illuminating threats for national security decisions, but 
for security purposes, security intelligence defines the operational environment and provides 
accurate threat data, driving a robust risk management cycle that enables security resources to be 
allocated according to an appropriate security posture. Consistent with the concentric circles of 
security, current intelligence will be analyzed from the outside-in to detect threats. A security 
programs intelligence personnel are be divided by two distinct focuses, all source intelligence 
and counterintelligence (CI). The all-source analysts will fuse finished intelligence reporting 
between the various disciplines to provide a single analytically sound intelligence estimate. The 
counterintelligence personnel will vary based on the type of customer; if they are a federal 
agency, they are badged and credentialed CI Special Agents, falling under that agency’s federal 
 
 
authority. If the customer is a defense contractor, they may contract CI Special Agents or utilize 
CI analysts to conduct similar analysis as their federal counterparts. The CDCs also maintain 
near constant coordination with CI Special Agents to ensure compliance with their sensitive 
programs and all security countermeasures are being followed.  
Unlike for national security, a security program’s intelligence collection assets are limited 
to technical tools that collect and analyze network data in a security operations center.  Without 
nonorganic or multispectral collection assets, all-source analysts may still reap the benefits of 
those tools through integration with the IC, in order to receive finished intelligence (FININT) 
reports that may illuminate a relevant threat to the customer. Integration into the IC facilitates 
information superiority that may prevent an attack and is imperative in providing accurate data 
used for risk analysis. This responsibility may be accomplished through networking and personal 
relationships with other agencies. It is also made possible by the intelligence personnel working 
with Intelligence Directorates and maintaining their Top-Secret clearances with the additionally 
required caveats. Maintaining strong relationships in the IC also enables security personnel to 
submit requests for information (RFI) with a higher likelihood of having them answered by a 
subject matter expert.  
Exemplifying the added value of submitting RFIs, the FBI posted one in March of 2019 
regarding the integrated analytic capabilities across media channels. However, based on security 
clearances, risk analysts may not share the same level of access to intelligence reports. This 
implies a strong need for mutual trust between the intelligence and risk personnel when vague 
intelligence assessments are made for the sake of benefiting from risk analysis, just without all 
the details of the report. Like the tipping and queuing of information that should occur between 
 
 
departments, can occur internally between the intelligence analysts and the risk and security 
personnel.  
Sharing information between federal, state, and local government entities along with 
industrial partners is so crucial that the Department of Homeland Security created 80 fusion 
centers across the U.S. for this purpose. Each center serves as a regional focal point where 
contributing members offer threat data that benefits and may protect others. The diversity among 
members’ missions and proficiencies enables increased situational awareness for everyone and 
provides a level of interdisciplinary expertise they would not be able to achieve individually. 
Additionally, each center’s intelligence products are shared through the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN), making their findings easily disseminated to all the other Fusion 
Centers and their members. 
The information analyzed and shared with the Fusion Centers depends on the threat 
landscape and may include cyber threat actors, indicators of compromise (IP Addresses), 
criminal threats like fraud, and any terror related activity. Ensuring security intelligence analysts 
are active members in their nearest Fusion Center is imperative to accomplishing their 
responsibilities. Individual security programs contribute to the Fusion Centers, but official 
products are approved by the senior intelligence analyst within the customer’s intelligence 
directorate. The exception to this requirement is updates on real time events or attacks, such as 
malicious IP addresses or a threat changing locations.   
Effective security programs differ from traditional ones because they are not built in 
silos, thus enabling them to handle any situation with internal capabilities and proficiencies. 
Many security programs are comprised of multiple departments, making the requisite 
coordination to accomplish protection objectives difficult. An example of how integrating 
 
 
intelligence accomplishes true security fusion is how they share information with the IT 
department / Security Operations Center (SOC). Depending on the size of the organization, at 
least one analyst will be assigned to the SOC, along with physical and information security 
personnel. In many organizations, the SOC is solely managed by the IT department; however, 
intelligence analysts have a significant stake in the organization’s SOC as they should be aware 
of what attacks are being defended against for attribution purposes. Intelligence personnel 
playing an active role in the SOC enables security intelligence to communicate hasty indicators, 
or alerts that may change the threat landscape, ultimately elevating the security posture in real 
time. Additionally, any information processed between the SOC and the analysts will add value 
to the Fusion Centers when shared.  
The all-source intelligence analyst’s main objectives are to evaluate ongoing threats and 
analyze the external operational environment (OE). While collection and analysis on both must 
remain a constant effort, analyzing the OE is initiated more generally in order to first identify the 
threats, which counterintelligence efforts focus on in more detail. However, it is imperative to 
understand the contrast between the security programs OE and the agency’s potential OE. If the 
customer’s facility is hypothetically located in Baltimore, Maryland, the customer’s OE is the 
city and surrounding areas within proximity. While the agency is physically in Baltimore, their 
mission set may focus on a country, or countries, in the Middle East where assets are deployed, 
making that their OE, not the city they are located. Per the DoD’s Joint Publication 2-01.3, 2014, 
“the operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that 
affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.” For holistic 
security, the decisions will determine the allocation of security resources and influence the 
customer’s security posture. The OE can be further described as the totality of operational 
 
 
variables within proximity of the customer. The variables may include infrastructure, social 
mores, politics, key personnel, and the way they all fuse together at any given time.  All these 
elements are determined and analyzed by intelligence analysts.  
A key element of the Joint Publication’s definition is ‘influence’ because it may be an 
indicator of threat probability. If the OE favors the customer’s presence, the likelihood of 
vandalism and other crimes decreases. However, if the location’s population negatively views the 
customer, they may be easily influenced to attack the facility or employees, even outside of the 
facility. This threat occurred in 1993 when a Pakistani man shot and killed two CIA employees 
on their way to work at the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The attacker claimed his 
motivation was anger about U.S. policy in the Middle East, which indicates he believed the 
CIA’s actions went against his beliefs.15 The most crucial point of this tragedy, in regards to the 
security program, is how the customer’s actions outside of the OE can influence behavior within 
the security program’s OE. Intelligence analysts will not have a need to know details about what 
operations the customer may be conducting, but a general understanding of the affected regions 
will provide insight about potential threats in the program’s OE and the intelligence personnel 
will be privy to that information through their relationships with the customer’s intelligence 
directorate. Additionally, their collection efforts of regional atmospherics will provide useful 
intelligence used to determine the programs overall security posture.  
Analyzing the OE must remain a cyclical effort as it is likely to develop rapidly. It is 
imperative for the intelligence analysts to always continue collecting on the cyber and 
information domains in addition to physical atmospherics as they all contribute to shaping the 
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OE. The main OE questions that will provide the most actionable intelligence for the program’s 
other facets are as follows: 
• What is the surrounding population’s general attitude/public opinion towards the 
customer? The public’s attitude towards the organization impacts security in many 
ways because it influences every interaction and the employees’ safety. 
Additionally, the customer’s employees are drawn from the local talent pool, 
which may affect the quantity and quality of those interested in working there. 
The resolve of employees may also indicate a heightened counterintelligence 
threat.16  
• Are there major events occurring that impact operations? This is important 
because large events may cause a change in response times and change the 
population make up.  
• Who/what are the key influencers (people, places, organizations) that draw the 
most public attention? Defining the societal pillars of influence enable 
intelligence personnel to constantly monitor and estimate the proverbial pulse of 
society. This element will likely include political personnel and parties.  
• Who could benefit from attacking the customer? This could include an 
organization, a person, or a nation. It is important because it will direct 
intelligence collection efforts and allow the intelligence personnel to further 
analyze the threats.  
• Are there signs of whomever may benefit from attacking the customer in the OE? 
This strictly refers to physical presence because cyber threat actors will always be 
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present in the cyber domain. However, monitoring potential attacker’s activity 
when physically present, or their presence alone if it is unusual, may indicate a 
need for heightened security.  
• Are nefarious IP addresses accessing the customer’s network? Third party 
companies, such as Recorded Future, provide a security service where they share 
IP Address Intelligence Cards. The IP Address Cards serve as a summary of 
essential information pertaining to an IP address and an associated risk score.17 
Understanding which IP addresses are associated with malicious behavior allows 
the customer to prevent their access to their network and reduce the potential for 
an attack. This level of current information gathering requires collaboration with 
industry partners, and the IC as the same blacklisted IP addresses commonly 
target more than one victim. This is how the IP addresses become known and 
blacklisted, but that only helps if the information is shared and reviewed by 
professionals. The malicious IP addresses are normally shared through the Fusion 
Centers, which further exemplifies the security program’s need to be connected to 
HSIN. 
• What cultural considerations are expected as normal social behavior? 
Understanding cultural norms enables the security program to better provide the 
‘customer service’ aspect of security by ensuring interpersonal and 
communication practices compliance; in effort to prevent or de-escalate any 
situation that could entice or create a threat. Additionally, knowing the normal 
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social behavior and training security personnel on it will enable them to realize 
the absence of normal or unusual behavior that may indicate a threat.  
Maintaining a current understanding of the OE ensures analysts will consequently 
understand the threat actors within it. By accurately recognizing and perceiving the threats, 
security can produce a far more accurate risk assessment than a risk management cycle that does 
not place much emphasis on analyzing OE information. However, collecting and estimating 
threat actor details is substantially more difficult due to the cyber domain. The intelligence 
analysts’ efforts monitoring data in the SOC will be crucial to accomplishing this objective. As 
attacks occur, cyber threat analysts will investigate their origins and assign attribution 
characteristics. This information is documented in a security information and event management 
system (SIEM), which will help identify patterns and provide vulnerability alerts. Non-attack 
information, such as data flows, telemetry, packet captures, syslog (message logging), and user 
account behavior will also be collected and analyzed to identify potential indicators of 
compromise.18 Of note, the FBI created Threat Assessment Teams who specialize in this type of 
analysis.  
1.3 Counterintelligence 
The risk of spies in the Intelligence Community is more prolific than ever before, which 
makes counterintelligence a crucial element of security intelligence operations. The Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms, 2005, defines counterintelligence as “activities concerned with 
identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence organizations or 
by individuals engaged in espionage or sabotage or subversion or terrorism.”  The term ‘Foreign 
intelligence entities’ (FIE) is now most used in place of hostile intelligence organizations. 
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However, their threat remains high as the FIEs recruit and emplace people like Ana Montes, 
Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen to steal U.S. secrets and spot potential spies. CI Agents work 
cooperatively with their cyber counterparts to investigate matters associated with the national 
security crimes outlined in AR 381-12. Their efforts will be derived from the customer’s Insider 
Threat program, which security programs are responsible for managing, and plays an integral 
role in the task of security intelligence and countering FIEs.  
Of all the threats facing the Intelligence Community, the threat of insiders stealing and 
leaking sensitive data remains the greatest security challenge to customers working in national 
security. Unfortunately, the digital world and global connectivity fosters an environment for 
insiders to quickly transfer large amounts of protected information to outsiders with a reduced 
likelihood of detection, as evidenced with perpetrators like Snowden. Plus, cyber 
countermeasures make remote hacking a very difficult task, making physical vulnerabilities the 
easiest to exploit from the inside. There are myriad reasons why insiders conduct espionage or 
steal information, but the damage to the security program’s customers can have fatal 
consequences, regardless of what the motivation is. Therefore, it is imperative for CI Agents to 
detect, deny, and defend against their efforts before the damage is done.  
The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center defines Insider 
Threat as “a current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or had 
authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data and intentionally misused that 
access to negatively affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's 
information or information systems. Insider threats, to include sabotage, theft, espionage, fraud, 
and competitive advantage are often carried out through abusing access rights, theft of materials, 
 
 
and mishandling physical devices.”19 Again, this definition closely aligns with the others who 
conduct intelligence for the security objectives. Insiders conduct attacks in every industry, but 
attacks within the intelligence community can cause far more serious consequences than those in 
private industry where only money is lost. When classified intelligence is leaked, it can provide 
nation-state competitors, or nefarious criminal enterprises, a strategic advantage by knowing 
what the U.S.’ actual objectives or motivations may be. Leaked intelligence can also provide a 
tactical advantage to adversaries if they use the information to conduct offensive 
counterintelligence operations against the security program’s customers. An example of this 
would be with Aldrich Ames in his attacks.   
Insiders may attack in many forms or, in some cases, not even know the damage they are 
causing. When classified information is leaked unintentionally, despite best efforts to safeguard 
it, the actors are known as careless or naïve insiders. The CERT Insider Threat team, part of 
Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, coined the term – unintentional 
insider threat (UIT). Their term, UIT, accounts for incidents when the protected information is 
accidentally disclosed on a website, mishandled in an unsecure environment, or inadvertently 
sent to the wrong party via email, fax, or mail.20 It also accounts for when users are hacked either 
through social engineering, phishing attempts, or malware/spyware. Lastly, UIT includes 
breaches where an insider mistakenly carries an unauthorized mobile device into a SCIF or 
secure area that can be compromised, or misplaces/incorrectly discards data.21 It is likely that 
insiders do not self-report when they conduct some of these actions, making accurate data loss 
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impossible to calculate. These are all examples of situations CI Agents would investigate, but 
security is tasked with mitigation and prevention. 
The greatest challenge CI Agents face with identifying malicious insiders is the fact that 
they are authorized users, usually conducting authorized matters of business, but with ulterior 
motivations. Their authorized activity makes it extremely difficult to measure their intent without 
creating false suspicion of an innocent employee, or alerting an actual insider that they are 
caught. This challenge is exacerbated by the fact that system administrators have little chance of 
recognizing when an employee is doing something malicious if they stay within the scope of 
their job. Operators in the SOC use User Activity Monitoring (UAM) tools to analyze a user’s 
activity on the customer’s network. The UAMs monitor the user’s endpoints and establishes 
patterns of behavior for how they interact with files and folders. A similar tool, also used by SOC 
operators, is User Behavior Analytics (UBA). The UBA also analyzes user behavior, but with the 
sole purpose of detecting threat. Through machine learning, the UBA is effective at detecting 
outliers, or anomalies, that may be indicative of a threat. The UBA differs from the UAM 
because it focuses on data collected from networks, hosts, and cloud environments, not just 
endpoints as the UAM relies on. Another tool used to determine indicators of compromise is 
Data Loss Prevention (DLP). Meant to catch data-use policy violations and leakage, DLPs 
provide the analysts another valuable tool.22 However, they require extensive data discovery and 
manpower to be effective and this is where working side-by-side with IT’s network analysts is 
imperative. Once the indicators of compromise are discovered, that evidence is passed to the CI 
Agents for further investigation.   
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Another area of CI focus that is crucial to security is that of background investigations for 
security clearances since the customer’s employees are all likely to possess one. Clearances are 
based on the hiring official’s determination of each position’s duties and responsibilities. The 
purpose of a security clearance is to determine whether an individual is trustworthy and 
competent enough to safeguard classified information. The background investigations required 
for clearances vary depending on the level required, but may include polygraphs and take years 
to conclude. Throughout the background investigations, many facets of the subject’s life will be 
analyzed to determine their loyalty, character, and reliability. Additionally, periodic 
reinvestigations are required every six years to ensure no negative changes have occurred in the 
subject’s character or ability to safeguard classified information.  
In September 2019, a significant change to the background investigation and the security 
clearance process occurred with President Trump signing Executive Order 13869. Prior to the 
new EO, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) had the primary responsibly of conducting 
the investigations. However, EO 13869 mandated the Defense Counterintelligence and Security 
Agency will realign with a newly created organization called the National Background 
Investigations Bureau and maintain primacy for the clearance and investigation process.23,24 
OPM was fraught with issues, making this executive action a significant effort in improving 
security and counterintelligence efforts.  
1.4 Insider Threat Program 
All the data collected and processed between security clearance investigations and in the 
SOC serve as only a portion of the insider threat program. Per Executive Order 13587, federal 
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organizations will conduct insider threat response actions and comply with all the outlined 
general responsibilities and requirements, while simultaneously improving the efficiency of the 
program and serving as the central program office. Assuming the role of the central program 
office, as delineated by the Director of National Intelligence’s National Insider Threat Task Force 
guide (NITTF), enables security to initiate action and responses more quickly by removing 
bureaucracy and the need to include other departments until necessary.25 Insider threat programs 
provide the status of maturity framework elements and incident reports to senior leadership on a 
monthly basis. To answer the dynamic requirements of the insider threat problem set, insider 
threat programs use the NITTF’s maturity framework to enhance the minimum standards. 
Regardless of who the customer is, insider threat programs will incorporate the following 
elements, which were derived from Executive Order 15587 and best practices outlined by the 
FBI, Defense Security Service, and the National Counterintelligence and Security Center to 
reduce risk: 
• Know the customer’s critical assets. Understanding what the customer’s assets are 
enables security to build countermeasures that effectively protect against them. It 
also helps identify who may be a threat by understanding what value the assets 
are. For federal agencies, assets may include networks, intelligence collection 
systems, people, classified information, or sensitive personnel data.  
• Document and enforce policies and controls. To influence compliance with 
effective security practices, expectations need to be well documented and 
disseminated to all those who are expected to obey them. Documenting incidents 
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and creating policies also educates people and builds situational awareness for the 
customers.  
• Analyze threats to assets. First the threats must be identified, either physical or 
cyber. Once identified, they must be profiled and cataloged for analysts to use as 
information develops, which may lead to patterns. The analysis must also be 
shared through fusion centers and with IC partners to either learn more or provide 
situational awareness to others. It is imperative to understand what the threat 
wants to attack, what motivates them, how they operate and what specific 
vulnerabilities they have the capabilities of exploiting. 
• Determining vulnerabilities. After knowing what the customer’s assets are, risk 
assessments identify and quantify vulnerabilities. This involves first identifying 
key assets and analyzing their value, placement, and the countermeasures 
guarding them. The vulnerabilities could include poorly trained personnel, 
malfunctioning security equipment, or a poor physical placement of the asset. For 
budget constraints, vulnerabilities are to be mitigated based on the criticality of 
the asset, its impact if lost, and likelihood of the associated threat, as defined by 
intelligence driven risk management.  
• Conduct in depth risk assessments. The risk management personnel’s assessments 
will provide the customer’s overall risk rating by quantifying the threats, their 
likelihood of attack, the customer’s vulnerabilities, and estimating the impact of a 
breach or loss of an asset. Most of the data used by risk analysts is provided by 
intelligence analysis. The risk assessments are updated constantly, reflecting the 
ever-evolving OE and threat landscape. As risk ratings increase or decrease, the 
 
 
security posture will adapt accordingly. Examples of risk are not always as glaring 
as terrorism or espionage and can include insufficient training, alcohol use, or 
even a lack of policies.  
• Implement countermeasures to address the threats and reduce risk that comply 
with minimum standards set by the National Counterintelligence and Security 
Center and NITTF. Based on the risk rating, security practices and 
countermeasures will be implemented to mitigate the associated risk. An elevated 
risk rating infers a more imminent possibility of attack. As the risk rating 
increases, a more aggressive security posture will mean stricter policies and less 
liberties until the threat is reduced. It may also mean travel is revoked or limited, 
large events are postponed, and passwords will need to be changed more 
frequently.  
• Monitor and respond to indicators of compromise. The designed and implemented 
countermeasures will include procedures for responding to attacks. The SOC will 
prepare for threats based on shared intelligence and manage all cyber incidents. 
Physical incidents are managed by emergency response personnel in accordance 
with the policies and regulations in place.  
• Conduct continuous review and training for employees and security personnel. It 
is imperative that a lifecycle management plan be incorporated into every process. 
Equally important is training the customer’s employees as a lack of situational 
awareness or understanding how to respond to certain situations may enable the 
attacker to remain undetected. Through training, employees will know how to 
report suspicious behavior and learn about recent events. Training for employees 
 
 
is best conducted once per year and mandatory online refresher training helps 
augment in between.  
• Consider the workplace environment. Fostering a positive and productive 
workplace reduces stress-caused disillusionment that may influence an employee 
to become a threat. Plus, the happier a workforce is, the more productive they are. 
In national security jobs, the stress may be higher than other careers where health 
and safety are not at risk. Encouraging innovation, rewarding performance, and 
cutting meeting times are free and simple things a customer may implement to 
improve moral and employee engagement.26  
Another dynamic aspect of the CI Agents’ responsibilities is ‘red teaming’ the customer’s 
facilities and security’s countermeasures. The term ‘red teaming’ has many definitions, but 
federal programs adhere to the DoD’s FM 34-60, 1995, description, which is hostile intelligence 
simulation. To better identify and assess vulnerabilities that are reported to risk analysts, red 
team operations occur as requested by leaders or as threat specific tactics, techniques, and 
procedures are learned. CI personnel coordinate and execute a simulated FIE attack against 
specified targets of interest as realistically as possible. Social engineering is a significant part of 
red teaming, so other department’s employees may be recruited to conduct attacks for the 
exercise since most employees are likely cognizant of the personnel’s identity and true 
intentions. The red team’s objectives may include breaching physical countermeasures or illicitly 
accessing the customer’s network.  
Chapter 1: Conclusion 
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Integrating intelligence operations into security programs is essential for federal 
organizations tasked with national security objectives. For any security program to be 
commensurate of its associated risk, constant analysis is required to ensure current information is 
being used for decision making. The process of collecting and analyzing that information is how 
intelligence operations supports security programs; it makes them more cost efficient, more 
proactive, and enables them to offer a more deliberate service to their customer.  
Intelligence drives the risk management and security operations cycles through ongoing 
threat and vulnerability assessments. As changes occur within the threat landscape, the program’s 
posture can adjust accordingly. In many cases, this involves allocating additional resources or 
implementing threat-specific countermeasures. Without ongoing intelligence, security programs 
are either based on a guess or old data. Additionally, intelligence is used to adequately assess the 
operational environment, which is how analysts know where to begin looking for threat data.  
Security programs that make intelligence an integral aspect of their program also enjoy 
increased collaboration within their organization. Many federal mandates require such teamwork, 
but programs benefit the most when it is organic as it decreases the potential seams in the 
customer’s overall protection; seams that attackers are known to exploit. Additionally, 
intelligence enables the security program to offer valuable information to regional fusion centers, 
therefore, there is potential they may make an impact on another organization’s protection as 
well. Examples of internal coordination are between physical, information (cyber), and personnel 
security departments, and even with other business departments such as IT, Human Resources, 
and supply chain management.  
There are many disciplines of intelligence that could all be used for security intelligence, 
but the two most common are open source intelligence and counterintelligence. Open source is 
 
 
used to gather crucial information in risk research, atmospherics, and analyzing the customer’s 
digital footprint. Counterintelligence is vital for insider threat programs, which is a significant 
threat in today’s environment. Counterintelligence is also used to conduct investigations and 
counter attacks by foreign intelligence entities. When used effectively, intelligence undoubtedly 
improves security. Unfortunately, the involvement of intelligence in security does not often get 
the credit it deserves due to the nature of its success equating to prevented and subsequently 
unknown attacks. The relationship between intelligence and security only received publicity after 
events from attackers such as Ana Montes, Edward Snowden, Nidal Hassan. 
Intelligence is the lifeblood of any holistic security program. Not only does it drive the 
risk management practices that influences countermeasures, it also impacts ancillary facets of the 
organization such as emergency response and crisis management. Additionally, intelligence is a 
timeless asset that extends beyond the role and responsibility of security; it effects supply chain 
management, public affairs, and human resources – creating an environment that benefits from 
applying a holistic security template.  
Chapter 2: Risk Management in Security  
 
Security programs exist to protect people, places, and information from traditional and 
emergent risks. Security is necessary because it reduces the impact of isolated, non-malicious 
incidents along with the more serious events like cyberespionage and workplace violence. In 
serving its role, security programs are customer focused and provide both reactive and proactive 
countermeasures that achieve the organization’s desired protection. A risk-based approach to 
security involves balancing between funding constraints and requisite levels of security, based on 
 
 
proactive analysis of each facility’s risks.27 This process stewards effective security risk 
management practices, which increases the organization’s level of protection. However, stubborn 
workplace cultures and limited threat information create challenges to using security risk 
management most effectively.  
It is difficult for federal security programs to adapt to their ever-changing threat 
landscapes and the risk is amplified by the likelihood a security event will echo far outside the 
compromised organization, potentially impacting national security. The threat landscape is more 
complex and advanced than what many other industries face due to the nature and capability of 
the U.S. government’s adversaries, especially given the advancements in technology and 
growing prevalence of cyberwarfare. However, federal security programs that effectively use 
risk management principles to augment their security strategy are more likely to protect their 
organizations successfully. The objective of this chapter is to illuminate what role risk 
management plays in federal security programs and articulate how it increases protection. By 
analyzing previous risk events, the determination was made that analyzing risk factors and 
consequently applying the principles of risk management can improve efficiency of federal 
security programs. The 2013 security breach perpetrated by Edward Snowden had a profound 
impact on moving the DoD toward a more risk informed culture, making it more difficult for 
future attackers to have the same effect.  
There are innumerable risk events throughout federal workplaces. However, many do not 
directly pertain to security, like reputation damage, poor organizational financial decisions, or 
pandemics such as COVID19. To better describe how risk management works symbiotically 
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with security programs, this thesis installment will use real-world cases for both cyber and 
physical events that exemplify specific points. Applying risk methodologies in consideration of 
similar events will increase the likelihood of preventing them, better prepare the victim to 
respond, and further reduce the impact since security events are inevitable. The federal 
workplaces include any place of employment where federal employees go to work on achieving 
national security objectives within the continental US. They may include federal intelligence 
agency headquarters buildings, military bases, or annex buildings of any federal organization.  
There are a plethora of regulatory requirements and risk frameworks available to the 
federal customers, yet most risk management decisions have the potential to be made only at the 
senior leadership level and not given much consideration by middle management down to the 
actual security personnel. The Armed Forces, of the Department of Defense (DOD), use a Force 
Protection Condition (FPCON) model, which the Geographic Combatant Commanders use to 
dictate the security postures of their facilities.28 When an FPCON is assigned, a canned set of 
security measures are followed based on a policy written to address a generic risk level. This is 
problematic because the threats that influence risk are dynamic and do not neatly fit into generic 
classifications, creating institutional vulnerability. Perhaps this is a weakness of the culture 
where employees are expected to simply follow orders without offering any sort of critical 
thinking, or maybe there are not enough details communicated about the change in threat 
information.  
Regardless, the practice of blindly allocating security resources without calculated 
rationale based on risk factors is merely guesswork, not effective security planning and the 
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reason applying risk management to daily security activities is necessary for improved 
protection. As this thesis will demonstrate, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the 
federal leader at integrating risk in every business decision for the sake of national security, 
creating an example for the DOD to follow. However, it is likely that other federal organizations, 
such as the Bureau of the Census and the Internal Revenue System (IRS), have stronger risk 
cultures than the DHS; the difference being the IRS and Census Bureau are not utilizing risk 
management practices to improve national security. 1  
An issue with security in every industry is the fact that it is always an overhead expense 
and never the purpose or strategic objective of the organization it serves. The same is true with 
federal organizations whose strategic objectives are national security related, not day to day 
security of a facility. The organizations often execute intelligence driven operations, 
investigations, and missions that support the requisite activities associated with protecting the 
homeland and interests abroad. Their activities may include developing new defense technology 
or assets, training defense personnel, investigating terror plots, or executing national security 
operations. Regardless, security operations are ancillary to many organizations’ main efforts. 
Security departments are essential to a safe working environment, but can be compared to other 
support elements like logistics, legal counsel, human resources, and maintenance in the eyes of 
senior leadership.  
Within the realm of security, there are many distinct disciplines: physical, information 
(includes cyber), operational, and personnel. The distinction is important because each discipline 
is usually its own department, or branch, and managed by different leaders within each 
organization. This leads to each security department being treated as a different system, which 
 
 
creates silos and unilateral decision making, despite how they depend on one another.29 In 2018, 
federal agencies submitted 31,107 cyber-attack incident reports, which warrants a higher amount 
of attention given to cybersecurity and proves they are constantly under attack.30 This operational 
silo approach causes differing risk practices, a lack of coordination/communication between the 
analogous teams, and departmental seams that present vulnerabilities, which are increasingly 
exploited by adversaries.31 However, cybersecurity departments differ from their physical-
security counterparts in their usage of security risk management; the objectives differ between 
defending against a virtual network and a physical facility.  
There seems to be a very present and concerted effort to practice sound risk management 
within cybersecurity, but bureaucracy, the complexity of the virtual domain, and ever-evolving 
threats make it more of a challenge than physical.  In 2018, Homeland Security Secretary, 
Kirstjen Nielsen, reported to a Senate Homeland Security committee that “cyberspace is the most 
active battlefield,” and her top priority.32 As a result, Secretary Nielsen created the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) as an element of the DHS in response to her concerns about 
cybersecurity. CISA improves the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure from both 
physical and cyber threats by improving communication and coordination. CISA provides 
comprehensive cyber protection, coordinates infrastructure resilience, emergency 
communications, and manages the National Risk Management Center.33 Given the DHS’s 
mission of protecting the homeland, they have historically championed facility security practices. 
However, lessons learned from previous risk events caused their efforts to include incorporating 
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risk management for the sake of improving security’s proactiveness and increasing its chances of 
preventing an event and/or reducing its impact.   
As this thesis installment will demonstrate, there is a strong nexus between risk 
management and security programs, making the customers far more secure. The paper will begin 
by providing a history on risk management within the government, because of the significant 
events that influenced where it stands today. Following the history, the importance of risk-
communication and clearly defining risk terms will be discussed, setting the stage for the risk 
model. The risk model section will go through each step and use event-based examples to 
articulate the importance of each. 
History of Risk Management in Government  
 
The value of applying risk methodology throughout the government became apparent in 
2016 when Circular No. A-123 was updated, mandating all federal agencies apply enterprise risk 
management (ERM) in pursuit of their strategic objectives.34 Circular No. A-123 was significant 
because it created the requirement  for organizations to use ERM as an internal control when 
they may not have previously done so. The act was managed by the administration’s Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) and placed significant emphasis on involving management in 
the process. Additionally, it created an avenue of accountability for financial responsibilities as it 
was published under the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA).35 The 
implementation of the circular was a step closer to having ERM applied to security programs, but 
its emphasis on financial decision making and its intended application on “strategic objectives” 
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makes it an unlikely consideration of security practitioners in their day to day security 
operations.  
In 1995, President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12977, which coordinated security 
initiatives throughout the government and created the Interagency Security Committee (ISC).36 
The establishment of the ISC was the President’s response to the bombing of the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Building, in Oklahoma City, which killed 168 people in the federal facility and 
injured nearly 700 others.37 On 17 April 2020, the current ISC Chairman, Mr. Brian M. Harrell, 
released a letter to federal facility security stakeholders that stated, “The aftermath of the 
bombing of the Murrah Building led to sweeping changes in how the U.S. Government 
approaches preventive security and protection of federal infrastructure.”38 Mr. Harrell was 
partially speaking to how risk management became part of ensuring security was preventative 
instead of reactive, as it was prior to the attack. The ISC was initially led by the General Services 
Administration (GSA), until the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which 
now chairs it and tasked CISA with its oversight.39,40 40 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1315, the 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21), and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
are foundational documents that codify DHS’s responsibility for protecting buildings, grounds, 
and property that are owned, occupied, or secured by the Federal Government; establish U.S. 
policy for enhancing protection and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure; and provide 
a framework for integrating efforts designed to enhance the safety of critical infrastructure.41 
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Through its creation of policies and assistance with implementation of standardized 
security risk processes, the ISC has been instrumental in establishing a strong federal security 
strategy in response to the aforementioned federal guidelines and requirements. The ISC’s efforts 
consist of regular working groups of security subject matter experts from 64 federal agencies, 
making the collaboration of prevention focused security standards more achievable.42 In addition 
to ISC’s collaborative efforts, the executive order encouraged organizations to share security 
related intelligence with other federal organizations in a timely manner, which empowers 
organizations to update their risk levels and security practices based on current information.  
The sharing of critical threat information reduces risk by enabling security programs to 
potentially make better, more informed operational decisions instead of working without a 
complete understanding of the operational environment. The Ft. Hood shooting, in 2009, is an 
unfortunate example of how sharing information on attack indicators could save lives. Both the 
FBI and DOD had important information on the shooter, but their failure to communicate the    
threat data resulted in each department missing information the other had and not acting.43 
Consequently, 13 lives were lost by not communicating and understanding the actual risk the 
shooter presented.  
To physically carry out and standardize security, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) 
was established as part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The FPS is responsible 
for ensuring safe and secure workplaces at approximately 9,500 federal facilities.44 The FPS 
takes the lead on ensuring building security by publishing emergency event plans, conducting 
assessments, and providing guidance on building new facilities. Additionally, the FPS has 
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operational law enforcement officers who respond to threats with their specialty teams, such as 
Explosive Canine Detection and Hazardous Response. However, the creation of ISC 
dramatically shifted FPS’s mission from building-security to one of law enforcement and threat 
mitigation.45 They accomplish their mission by identifying and mitigating security vulnerabilities 
through ensuring qualified individuals are on guard and using technology and collaboration as a 
force multiplier in their operations. ISC and FPS account for a significant amount of the 
government’s ability to implement risk management into security as their efforts are what make 
it possible.  
In 2016, the ISC published an interagency standard for risk management at federal 
facilities, likely in response to the circular. To assist with the implementation of the circular, the 
OMB also created an enterprise risk management (ERM) playbook that can be used in 
conjunction with the ISC’s risk management standard. OMB’s playbook provides key concepts 
and guidance for agency management to update their internal controls and modernize their risk 
management efforts.46 It was created by risk practitioners and cross functional representatives 
from over 20 agencies to ensure it met the requirements of each organization. Between these 
resources and the support offered by the FPS, federal organizations have an abundance of 
security risk management guidance and publications to use in their risk management efforts.  
Defining Risk Management and Federal Facility Security  
 
There are many terms used to discuss planning for and understanding undesired events 
within an organization. The DHS’s Risk Lexicon defines risk management as “a process of 
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identifying, analyzing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, transferring, or 
controlling it to an acceptable level considering associated costs and benefits of any actions 
taken.”47 However, risk management is often departmentalized and fails to account for 
implications outside of a given department. It combines threat information, internal 
vulnerabilities, and the estimated impact of a potential event to create a quantifiable risk level or 
score. Alternatively, ERM is used as an extension of traditional risk management and considers 
the risk level to the entire organization, but the success imperative is communicating risk 
information throughout the organization. Consistent with the guidance put out by the executive 
office’s circular, ERM is strategic and requires more involvement from senior leaders to ensure 
risk is evaluated in a holistic fashion.48 Both ERM and traditional risk management are meant to 
be ongoing processes that help organizations control and reduce their risk level through a more 
informed decision-making cycle.  
At the onset of the circular, all agencies were mandated to generate an initial risk register, 
which provided details to senior leaders on the risks to their organization. This process enabled 
the senior leaders to determine their risk appetite, which is the amount of risk their organization 
is willing to accept in pursuit of its objectives.49 The determination of an organization’s risk 
appetite is communicated through a risk appetite statement, where the amount and type of risk 
the organization accepts is communicated and used to ensure each department or branch is 
operating within the bounds of its tolerance. Additionally, the risk appetite statement is 
instrumental at influencing the organization’s attitude towards risk because it shows there is buy-
in from senior leaders who approve it. However, the risk appetite is not optional; The 
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Government Performance and Results Act Modernization Act (GPRAMA) requires agencies to 
review and revise strategic plans every four years, which includes a review of their risk appetite 
and necessitates an analysis of the organization’s holistic risk picture.50  
As stated, the constant flow of information is what makes ERM successful. The two-way 
flow, between senior leaders and subordinates, enables security program managers to adapt their 
controls according to new strategies and, conversely, senior leaders can update their risk appetite 
based on emerging information. Additionally, this is how prioritization occurs, which allows 
security to focus on the fewer, but more significant, risks to improve the likelihood of mitigation. 
If risk priorities are not established and communicated, the security program stands to invest 
resources on many minor risks and not preventing the major ones as a result.  
Federal facility security is implemented as a means of reducing an organization’s risk. Its 
efforts include operations, personnel, and policies that reflect the unique needs of each 
organization. For security to appropriately allocate resources and plan, they must conduct 
thorough risk analysis through the assessment process. Security’s operations may also include 
investigations, training, and emergency response. In 1995, the US Marshals Service created a 
rating scheme for classifying security levels of each facility:  
Level I—buildings with no more than 2,500 square feet, 10 or fewer federal employees, 
and limited or no public access; 
Level II—buildings with 2,500 to 80,000 square feet, 11 to 150 federal employees, and 
moderate public access; 
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Level III—buildings with 80,000 to 150,000 square feet, 151 to 450 federal employees, 
and moderate to high public access; 
Level IV—buildings with 150,000 square feet or more, more than 450 federal employees, 
and a high level of public access; and 
Level V—buildings that are similar to Level IV but are considered critical to national 
security (e.g., the Pentagon).51,52 
There are approximately 446,000 federal facilities across the US, ranging between every 
department and branch of the government. Of these, FPS monitors and provides security services 
at about 9,500, leaving other agencies to protect the rest.53 To bolster FPS’s coverage, they 
outsource protection to guard force management companies, equating to over 15,000 additional 
security officers standing guard at their facilities. Of the remaining 436,500 facilities, the 
manning of physical security is often left to the discretion of the various departments or agencies. 
According to the Department of Justice’s Office of Justice Programs, there are over 20 federal 
law enforcement entities that protect many of the other facilities.54     
Communicating Risk Management  
 
In 2016, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducted a study on how ERM 
has been implemented across the government. One of their key findings was the importance of 
an organization’s senior leaders making risk management a part of the workplace culture. 
Without senior leadership’s commitment to ERM, organizations are unlikely to take the extra 
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time necessary to apply it in the decisions they make. Additionally, North Carolina State 
University discovered that if senior leaders fail to recognize the value of risk management, they 
become the greatest risk to the process. Their lack of support becomes a detriment to its potential 
success by increasing the chances that employees will ignore risk indicators or fail to 
communicate them effectively. Senior leaders can also impair the risk management process by 
ignoring risk factors themselves, working against the risk efforts for personal agendas, or by 
being nonexistent in the process.55 Conversely, senior leaders can be the driving force at building 
a risk-informed culture through communicating its importance throughout the organization. 
Communication, both internally and externally, is an essential aspect of making risk part 
of the workplace and protecting the organization; highlighting risks and finding pragmatic 
solutions can prevent catastrophes if it becomes the norm.56 The GAO study reported one of the 
best practices they discovered was creating a “risk informed” culture where all employees can 
communicate risks according to the organizations reporting policy. Encouraging employees to 
raise risk concerns and openly discuss them fosters a positive workplace that promotes risk 
management and increases the chances of risk discovery.57 This process is amplified if the 
organization’s risk appetite is communicated throughout the ranks, making it known to the 
employees what senior leadership’s priorities are.  
Most federal security programs begin each shift with a roll call, which is shift change 
brief used to communicate current events or specific post orders to the oncoming shift.58 The roll 
calls are effective opportunities to communicate risk considerations. If information was received 
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that changed the threat landscape, security and/or law enforcement personnel would be able to 
adjust their procedures accordingly. However, communication must flow both ways between the 
security personnel and senior leaders. When information is discovered that changes the threat 
landscape, judgement must be made whether to report it to the senior leaders through the chain 
of command. Communicating security risks is an effective way to cause an organization’s 
leadership to view those risks the same as other business risks, which also benefits security 
departments when funding decisions are being made.59 Not every risk event is going to change 
the organization’s risk level, but having middle management competent enough to critically 
consider the strategic implications of every event would make a significant impact on the 
relationship between senior leadership and middle management through added mutual trust. 
Additionally, training security personnel to consider risk to other departments, outside of 
security, is exactly what the circular and accompanying information on ERM intended.  
Establishing information flow and communicating threat information laterally between 
departments is another crucial aspect for implementing risk management. Yet, the silos of 
physical security, personnel security, and information security create a lapse in that essential 
communication. The poor communication is likely a result of time constraints, or a false sense of 
reliance on the other departments to consider holistic implications. This breakdown of 
communication creates a significant vulnerability in the organization’s protection when there is 
not a thorough awareness of the each other’s strategy and challenges.60 Many of the US 
government’s adversaries use social engineering to enable their cyberattacks, accelerating the 
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cyber and physical attack convergence.61 It is challenging to connect dissimilar events, like a 
firewall breach and an unauthorized visitor wandering around the halls, especially when security 
personnel are usually understaffed and task saturated. However, communicating all suspicious 
events between departments may provide analysts the information they need to discover a new 
threat actively attacking the organization and give security the warning they need to prevent it.  
A clear example of a recent blended physical-cyberattack was in March of 2020 when 
hackers from the FIN7 cyber-criminal group sent malicious USB drives disguised as Best Buy 
rewards to specific people at each targeted organization. The packages sometimes contained gifts 
along with the USB drive, like teddy bears and gift cards, meant to entice the recipient and 
bolster its validity. The detail of knowing who to address the packages to illustrate the deliberate 
act of targeting US personnel in positions with the placement and access to something FIN7 
sought out. The USB drives contained GRIFFON malware, capable of espionage and 
destruction. FIN7’s plan used social engineering to fuse the physical act of sending USB drives 
to specific recipients with the purpose of conducting a destructive remote, cyber-attack that 
would have been executed if any one of the recipients plugged them in.62  
If an employee of the U.S. government received one of FIN7’s packages, communicating 
it throughout the organization would reduce the chances of it working against them. It would 
most likely be reported to physical security given their presence and availability to employees 
compared to their cyber counterparts, who are often working outside of public view. Proper risk 
management activities would involve communicating every detail of the event to cyber security 
for the purpose of identifying the malware on the USB drive and taking the necessary 
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precautions. After the details are analyzed, the organization may alter its security posture based 
on its new risk level. The factors that would influence the risk level are who it was sent from (the 
threat), what its intent was (the threat’s will), who it was sent to (the organization’s 
vulnerability), and what it could achieve against the organization (capability and impact). 
Additionally, passing the information to counterintelligence would prompt an investigation into 
why that specific employee was targeted, as encouraged by EO 12333.63 Lastly, collaboration 
would enable the organization to broadcast the threat details to the entire organization for 
educational and warning purposes, which would increase the likelihood of other employees 
reporting suspicious behavior. Adhering to ISC’s guidance, this information would also be 
shared with other organizations throughout the defense industry to reduce the risk of other 
agency’s employees being compromised.  
A real-world example of an attack against the government occurred in 2008, later named 
Buckshot Yankee, and was the catalyst for banning portable media devices in government 
facilities. A US Soldier found a USB drive in the parking lot of a base in the Middle East and 
plugged it into the network. The Soldier was unaware that the USB drive contained very 
malicious malware that eventually infected both the Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router and 
Secret Internet Protocol Routers of US Central Command. It took 14 months to recover from and 
eliminate the threat introduced by that USB drive and the exact damages have not been disclosed 
to the public.64 It required an analyst from NSA to discover the threat and investigate to discover 
the network had been breached. The event was then communicated throughout the defense 
community so necessary precautions may be taken to prevent the spread. This is an example of 
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how risk management and security can work in harmony to better protect everyone. 
Unfortunately, it took a very damaging breach to occur before proper security policies were 
implemented, much like what happened after the Alfred Murrah building bombing in 1995.   
Security Risk Model  
 
The following security risk model was published in the GSA’s Playbook: Enterprise Risk 
Management for the US Federal Government. The GSA created the playbook to aid the ISC with 
implementing the risk management process throughout federal facilities. Therefore, it is the 
standard used by security and risk personnel at each federal organization when considering and 
planning for the protection of each building’s systems and elements.65 There are many other risk 
management models and processes, but this was created for integration into the government and 
the following sections will outline and discuss each step with real world examples. There are 
very minor discrepancies between other models, with the most significant being the emphasis 
placed on communication and analysis. The variance is likely due to the revenue driven nature of 
private industries compared to the national security focus of the government organizations using 
GSA’s model. In many cases, risk management also differs in private industry because of the 
effect actions have on stock prices and the approval process of executive boards.  
Step 1: Establish Context 
 
 Within the U.S. government, the first step of security risk management is establishing 
risk context based on the facility security level (FSL), which is assigned to each federal facility. 
The FSL is derived from assessing risk factors such as mission criticality, symbolism, facility 
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population, facility size, threats to the agency, and any intangible factors.66,67 The FSL sets a 
quantitative objective for security to achieve through their efforts. Critical to establishing context 
is determining what requirements and constraints influence the decision-making process of the 
organization’s senior leaders. This may include policy concerns, mission needs, agency culture, 
and their unique risk appetite.68 In establishing context, a baseline level of protection (LOP) will 
also be determined, which should be commensurate with its level of risk. There are 31 different 
threat scenarios used by risk analysts to determine the appropriate LOP, ranging from active 
shooters to arson.69 The LOP then includes the specific countermeasures security will implement 
at the facility to meet the associated FSL. This practice stewards funding and operational 
decisions that influence the implementation of appropriate countermeasures. Without accurately 
understanding the FSL and LOP, federal organizations would be making uninformed decisions 
on their protection needs.  
 Based on the Washington Navy Yard’s FSL, strict access control measures and a strong 
physical security posture were set in place, per the ISC’s guidelines. Additionally, the Office of 
Personnel Management (OPM) conducted background investigations to determine every 
employee’s eligibility to enter the facility based on suitability and fitness for duty. Background 
investigations are a crucial aspect of risk management, but are not a guarantee of future behavior 
as they only uncover information about the subject’s past.70 In the case of the Navy Yard 
shooting, the shooter had a criminal background with gun related incidents that would have 
prevented him from being employed if discovered during his investigations, his employer told 
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the media.71 However, the shooter had a pre-existing Secret security clearance that was granted 
by the Navy in 2008, despite that investigation uncovering his deception and omittance of 
previous criminal charges. Additionally, supervisors from both the Navy and his civilian 
employer claimed they were aware of his mental illness and deception on his background 
investigation, but it was never reported to the appropriate security clearance officials.72  
This example highlights significant human errors that caused an extremely traumatic 
experience for many people, leading to the death of 12 Navy Yard employees. However, based 
on the facility’s FSL and resulting security posture, the impact of the attack was less than it could 
have been. Part of the Navy Yard’s LOP included armed Military Police and Security Officers, 
who created resistance for the shooter and restricted his freedom of movement, which likely 
reduced casualties.73 While there was a clear failure in executing the security clearance 
countermeasures, overall the risk management process was successful at mitigating the risk by 
limiting the threats impact.             
Step 2: Identify Risks 
 
 The next step is identifying and assessing all hazards risk through continual analysis. 
Since risk is a product of threat, impact, and vulnerability factors, analyzing them and the 
associated conditions is the only way to accurately determine if the baseline LOP is enough or 
requires customization. Mitigating vulnerabilities to threats, through elimination or reduction, 
along with their potential impact is the objective of this process and accomplished through 
security’s countermeasures. There are a variety of mathematical models and algorithms risk 
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practitioners may use to illustrate the impact of increasing protective countermeasures on the risk 
equation. These models are often used for quantitative risk assessments, which are highly 
effective at portraying numerical values of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts. For security risk 
purposes, these are most valuable for specific risk assessments as the model can demonstrate 
how the countermeasures influence the LOP.  
 Identifying risks is often confused with threat identification. However, illuminating the 
threat landscape is only part of risk identification because it involves things that are not threats, 
such as poor training and toxic leadership. In the Navy Yard shooting, testing the security alarm 
may have resulted in a newly identified risk; the sound of the alarm’s siren was too loud, causing 
sensory overload for responders and occupants of the building and severe degradation of their 
ability to communicate.74 The extreme sound elevated the facility’s risk level because of how it 
impaired the response capabilities and created a more dangerous environment. Preemptively 
identifying this and communicating it to those who needed to know would have enabled security 
to adjust the siren to a more appropriate decimal level before an incident occurred, which would 
have facilitated a safer and more efficient response. 
Step 3: Analysis and Assessments 
 
 Risk analysis is a process meant to assess the size and severity of risks, both individually 
and collectively, so appropriate countermeasures can be implemented. Risk assessments are a 
tool used to facilitate the analysis, and may involve facility audits, surveys, or evaluating specific 
concerns. Throughout the assessment process, risks are identified and categorized based on 





understand the root causes, sources, and potential negative or positive outcomes. Then it 
becomes imperative for organizations to reduce their risk through allocating resources for their 
mitigation efforts. However, being too risk-averse may also be detrimental because of how that 
may lead to a misappropriation of personnel or finance resources when risk data does not support 
the associated actions.  
There are two types of risk assessments, organizational and specific. Organizational risk 
assessments encompass the overarching organizational structure, resources, budget, employee 
commitment and account for the organization’s mission.75 An organizational risk assessment 
could be used to update senior leaders to ensure the organization’s risk appetite is current and 
constantly followed. As a form of governance, any changes in the risk appetite would be 
immediately communicated through the security leadership to ensure security practices were 
aligned, thus further guiding the allocation of resources and financial planning purposes.  
A specific risk assessment is tailored to an individual business unit or department and its 
unique objectives, not the strategic objectives of the organization. Conducting risk assessments 
provides analysts and leaders the information required to conduct thorough analysis based on a 
point in time under review. The act of analyzing a specific risk is considered a subcomponent of 
the dynamic risk assessment process, which are not always threat driven. It involves analyzing 
data to develop hypotheses and identify conditions of risk events, risk factors, and their potential 
substitutes. However, the result of any risk assessment can be qualitative or quantitative, 
depending on the needs and information of the organization. A qualitative risk assessment is 
 





advantageous when historical data is not available, there are resource restrictions, risk factors are 
not fully understood, and management will better understand a descriptive presentation. A 
quantitative risk assessment is better for an organization when there is a general agreement on 
underlying assumptions, numerical scores can be used to describe risk factors, and enough data is 
available for the analysis.76 Both kinds of risk assessments will describe conditions required for a 
risk event, the associated factors, and account for any cause and effect relationships. Risk 
assessments aim to answer the following questions: What can go wrong? What is the likelihood 
that it will go wrong? And what are the consequences if it goes wrong?77 
To accurately answer the risk assessment questions, the first aspect of the required 
analysis is threat identification, which is determining all potential dangers and hazards, like an 
active shooter or cyberattack. Threat identification provides an opportunity to conduct analysis 
on the threat landscape, which is a collection of all individual threats to the organization. This 
makes the ISC’s increased collaboration and timely sharing of intelligence vital for gaining 
valuable time and providing a more complete picture of the threat landscape, because it is 
possible for threats to be missed. Since the nature of every threat is to thwart countermeasures, 
the analysis of each individual threat is important for appropriate asset allocation and security-
risk decision making.  
Examining and understanding each threat’s “capability” and “will” provides actionable 
insight for the risk and security managers to consider. In some cases, a threat is highly capable of 
a deadly attack, but lacks the will or motivation to execute it, which reduces its threat score. An 
example would be a disgruntled employee who wishes to harm fellow employees, but is 
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incapable of obtaining a weapon to do so; their will alone makes them a threat, but their inability 
to obtain a weapon reduces their capability, and consequently their threat level. However, some 
threats are non-criminal, such as a labor strikes, power failures, and natural disasters, but they 
too must be considered and assessed when evaluating the threat landscape as security 
departments will have a role in responding to them as well. Aside from the practical 
considerations for a security program, understanding every possible threat is also used for 
insurance liability coverage and preparing for anticipated events.  
   Another aspect of analyzing risk is identifying and evaluating internal vulnerabilities. 
An organizational vulnerability is any weakness that an aggressor could exploit, anything that 
could hinder the organization’s response after an incident, or anything of value susceptible to 
damage from a threat. General vulnerability examples include single points of failure, ease of an 
aggressor to access an asset, or presence of valuable material, such as classified information or 
advanced weaponry as many federal security programs are charged with protecting. Physical 
vulnerabilities may include weak door locks, poor security policies, inadequately trained security 
personnel, or even poorly marked buildings that could delay first responders, which happened in 
the Navy Yard shooting.78 Information, or cyber, vulnerabilities could include weak firewalls, a 
lack of paper shredders, poor password policies, or outdated security software. Maintaining an 
ongoing understanding of the organization’s vulnerabilities enables it to also calculate the 
potential cost associated if a vulnerability is exploited.  
The final aspect of analyzing risk is understanding the impact, or potential consequences, 
of a risk event. For impact to be fully understood, analysts need to completely understand the 
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value of the assets they are analyzing and what would happen if they were compromised. Assets 
may be tangible, like buildings or people, or intangible like reputation or organic knowledge. 
The impact of a compromised asset may be calculated by direct cost, damage to the mission, or 
the potential for loss of life. To better understand consequences, impact models may be used as a 
tool for depicting possible outcomes. The information derived from the models can be used as 













The physical construction of the Alfred Murrah Federal Building, in Oklahoma City, 
represents a poor or nonexistent impact analysis because of the weak steel chosen to build the 
structure, along with the absence of any access control measures. The Murrah building was 
attacked by a truck bomb that sheared off the front half of its structure because the steel melted 
from the heat of the bomb, which detonated at an ideal range for massive damage. In the 
example from Figure 1.0, the likelihood of a bomb detonating may have been awarded a numeric 
value of 3 because it was possible, but lacked threat indicators or data insinuating an eminent 
attack. However, the impact would have been rated “Very High,” giving it a risk score of 15 and 
classifying it as a “High Priority” risk.  
Estimating potential impact of compromised assets in conjunction with threat levels and 
vulnerabilities enables the analytic process to produce a security risk score. Since security risk 
scores are based on a consistent methodology, they establish priorities for where an organization 
is most at risk and needs to allocate additional security resources for mitigation and risk 
reduction efforts. The process of risk analysis enables risk management to build on the 
assessment’s findings by answering another set of questions: What can be done and what options 
are available? What are the associated trade-offs in terms of all costs, benefits, and risks? What 
are the impacts of current management decisions on future options? Had risk management been a 
consideration in the Murrah building example, the high priority score of 15 would have 
warranted additional resources to reduce the score. If the assessment was completed pre-
construction, it is highly likely stronger steel beams would have been selected to build the 
structure. Additionally, better access control procedures, like traffic bollards, would have been 
built to limit a vehicles proximity to the building, which would weaken a bombs effectiveness. 
The tradeoffs would have been an increased walking distance for employees and visitors along 
 
 
with more expensive construction materials in exchange for many lives. Unfortunately, the 
Oklahoma City bombing was the catalyst for many of the progressive security risk management 
practices used today, not just in government, but every industry.   
Step 4: Develop Alternatives 
 
 Driven by the organization’s risk appetite, choosing response options, or strategies, for 
accepting, transferring, sharing, avoiding, or mitigating major risks is the next step in the risk 
management process. While also highly analytical, it is during this step that the cost of 
addressing the risk compared to the risk exposure will be considered and used for asset allocation 
decisions by senior leadership. It is middle management’s job to provide control options, which 
may be preventative, corrective, directive, or detective in design.79 The alternatives are selected 
based on the organization’s mission, regulatory requirements, and available resources.  
 Risk acceptance differs from the other alternatives because it does little to reduce its 
effect. Instead, it is an acknowledgement and signifies that senior leadership is aware of the risk 
and believes it to be within their risk appetite. Accepting risk often occurs when the cost of other 
options, such as mitigation or avoidance, outweighs the risk itself.80 Within the government, 
commanders and senior leaders decide to accept risks on a case by case basis, often based on the 
recommendations of their subordinates.  
 Transferring risk involves the contractual relationship of a third party, often an insurance 
company, that accepts responsibility for covering losses. Insurance exists as a means of 
transferring risk through a policy that covers certain events. Many regulations require very 
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specific insurance policies to meet compliance needs. However, the cost of insurance varies 
based on the level of risk they are being transferred through the policy. An example of risk 
transfer is workers’ compensation, which is what prevents an employee from suing their 
employer for on the job injury or death. The family of a victim from the Navy Yard shooting 
sued the government for negligence because the Department of the Navy and the Department of 
Veterans Affairs failed to revoke the shooter’s access after many warnings of his mental health 
issues.81 They reached a monetary settlement five years after the case was filed, which was likely 
paid by insurance.  
 Sharing risk is like transferring it, but differs because there is no monetary exchange and 
it divides the total risk between two or more parties. Many of the federal mandates and 
regulations regarding security and risk management are an effort to share risk. Increasing 
collaboration and involving organizations such as the ISC and FPS are strong examples of risk 
sharing given the duality of efforts. However, it only applies to organizations working together to 
reduce risk, uninvolved third parties do not share risk directly.  
 Risk avoidance is a key element of risk management. It can be accomplished by not 
participating in activities that create risk factors or eliminating a risk event’s chance of occurring. 
Security does a great job using risk avoidance at federal facilities by creating and enforcing 
prohibited items policies under 18 USC 930; many federal facilities prohibit employees from 
entering the workplace with 3+ inch long blade pocket knives, portable media devices, or 
alcohol.82 Security screening of employees and visitors make these policies effective. Removing 
the prohibited items avoids their associated risk by eliminating the threat they pose.  
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 Lastly, “risk mitigation” is a general term used to describe the actions taken to reduce 
adverse effects.83 This option is made possible by accurate analysis, but heavily executed by 
security programs. Security’s use of deterrence, response, defense, and investigative operations 
are all aspects of risk mitigation. Installing security cameras are an example of risk mitigation 
because it allows security personnel to monitor the safety of their facility without a physical 
presence. It is important that risk mitigation strategies match their organization’s risk appetite 
and unique mission objectives, which will be manifested into its security posture.  
Step 5: Respond to Risks  
 
 Responding to risk is an ongoing, multi-phased aspect of the risk management process. 
Like choosing a risk alternative, first assessing the organization’s risk is the only way to ensure 
an appropriate response. Based on the risk priority list, strategies are to be created and 
implemented to manage them. In some cases, risk response is exemplified through traditional 
security practices as they often prevent a risk occurrence. However, emergent threats require a 
more immediate response, such as additional security personnel, stricter access control measures, 
or added employee searches.  
 Choosing a risk response strategy is often done by senior leaders as they are the ones 
capable of approving the associated costs. Risk response can be a strategic, forward leaning 
approach meant to address a future risk based on something that will only threaten the 
organization later. Or, risk response can be an emergency when prior risk reduction or mitigation 
practices take effect and require immediate attention. The government’s response to the 
Buckshot Yankee breach involved cyber analysts first understanding the impact of the malware 
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by tracing its steps. Only then was the NSA able to make recommendations based on what 
information was compromised and how it maneuvered through the networks. In the Navy Yard, 
security and law enforcement personnel responded by engaging the shooter directly and 
ultimately taking his life to eliminate the threat.  
Step 6: Monitor and Review 
 
Through constant monitoring, risk information is acquired and must be reviewed to 
ensure the organization is still protected effectively. To do so, organizations must regularly 
review, monitor and update their risk registers to reflect any changes in their threat landscape or 
vulnerabilities. Risk reviews should occur semi-annually at a minimum and are meant to be an 
on-going process between security personnel and senior leadership.84 Organizations benefit the 
most when risk reviews result in communication that highlights the status of risk response 
activities and actions because of the added awareness and reminder of their dedication to risk 
management. The risk communication may also include information on residual risk, milestone 
updates, or where additional response is required.85  
Step 7: Continuous Risk Identification and Assessment  
 
 




Lastly, the entire risk management model is meant to be an iterative process, constantly 
occurring, and requiring accurate analysis. However, the analysis is only as good as the available 
information, which is why continuous risk identification and assessments are necessary. As 
informative products, risk assessments 
can be living documents that evolve 
with new information or updated 
analysis. They are also meant to account 
for risk indicators internal and external 
to the organization, with collaboration 
being at the forefront of every risk 
endeavor. Building risk management 
into the workplace culture enables the 
organization to learn from and improve 
its processes from its managed risks, near misses, or any risk event that occurred.86 Figure 2.0 
shows Step 7 as a circular band, encompassing the previous 6 steps because it is vital to the 
organization’s continued success with risk management.  
Chapter 2: Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, fusing risk management with security programs is a proven way to 
increase protection by reducing an organization’s exposure to risk. It ensures that security 
programs are not standing still in a complex and fluid threat landscape. Its importance is 











organizations to make it part of their practices due to the assurances it provides. The EOs and 
circulars ensure senior leadership play a positive role in stewarding the risk management process. 
Additionally, communicating and building a strong risk-informed culture pays dividends by 
expanding awareness and generating pragmatic solutions. This is especially true in a federal 
setting where communicating risk and transparency is an expectation of the tax payers, relevant 
stakeholders, and Congress.87 
Unfortunately, much of risk management’s value in security was discovered through the 
analysis of great tragedies, such as the Navy Yard shooting and the Oklahoma City bombing of 
the Murrah Building. Thankfully, organizations recognize the need to evolve and have the help 
from government elements like the ISC. Through new policies and risk informed security 
practices, federal workplaces will find the protection they need to operate without interruption of 
violence or issues that disrupt their ability to continue protecting the country. While many of the 
civilian organizations seem to have evolved seamlessly, it appears as if the service components 
still have a lot of room to grow. Many of the guidelines disseminated by the DHS and the ISC 
articulate that they do not apply to military bases, leaving a significant vulnerability. This is 
potential evidence that the DOD is behind in this regard and supports the notion that FPCONs 
alone are not the most effective strategy to protect a base. Implementing risk-based security 
programs requires tremendous analysis, dedication, and effort, but is a worthy investment 
because of the potential to save countless lives. It is impossible to quantify exactly how many 
risk events are prevented by the risk model, but its integration with federal security programs 
undoubtedly makes federal facility workplaces much safer. 
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Chapter 3: Insider Threat 
 
When assessing an organization’s threat landscape, external threats are often the focus of 
analysis. Unfortunately, the threat from within is increasing in prevalence, complexity, and 
jeopardizing national security. As the threat landscape continues to evolve, so too must the 
industries it indiscriminately victimizes. Currently, insider attacks occur most often in the 
healthcare, government, manufacturing, technology, and finance verticals. However, the focus of 
this thesis installment will be the impact to national security from insiders within the Department 
of Defense (DoD) and their associations with security and risk management programs, as 
discussed in the previous 2 chapters.  
Insider attacks account for billions of dollars lost annually, in actual and/or potential lost 
revenue, as reported by ODNI, but how is the damage to national security quantified?88 The 
complexity associated with answering that question lies within the organization’s ability to 
capture events that never occur, as that is the nature of any ITP and makes their success 
extremely difficult to quantify. Insider threats are influenced by a combination of technical, 
behavioral, and organizational issues, which makes the overall threat incredibly complex and 
difficult to defend against when combined with each attacker’s differing motivations. Insider 
attacks can include theft, violence, sabotage and can occur in both the physical and cyber 
domains. An organization can often detect or control when an outsider (non-employee) tries to 
access restricted data, either physically or electronically, and can more easily mitigate that threat 
from the damage they intend to cause. However, an employee with trusted access is more 
difficult to detect and, for that reason, can produce prolonged damage; a problem the U.S. 
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government contends with on a constant basis as cleared employees have regular access to 
information that “the unauthorized disclosure of could be expected to cause exceptionally grave 
damage to national security,” as defined by section 1.1 of Executive Order (EO) 12356.89  
Insider threat attacks will likely continue growing in complexity and frequency as foreign 
competitors seek to gain advantages over the U.S., both economically and in global power, 
making the government a lucrative and strategic target. However, insider attacks that involve a 
foreign adversary requires coordination between the attacker and the adversarial state, which is 
often for the sake of espionage. This makes insider threats not only a security issue, but also an 
area of focus for counterintelligence (CI), as discussed in the 2020 National Counterintelligence 
Strategy. Due to the complexity, rising frequency, and potential for catastrophic damage, the 
U.S. Government has made many mandates for how federal organizations protect against the 
threat, such as Executive Order 13857 and a national Task Force. Yet, security and 
counterintelligence programs are likely still understaffed and under-resourced, creating an 
exploitable opportunity for adversaries to use insiders against the U.S. government. Additionally, 
there is a glaring cyber knowledge gap between physical security practitioners, 
counterintelligence personnel, and the information security departments, as discussed in chapter 
1. This thesis installment will clearly define what an insider attack is and how a breach from 
within jeopardizes national security. Case studies will be used to illustrate how different insider 
attacks broke down security practices, furthers the need for intelligence driven security 
programs, and how risk management played into each scenario.  
What is an ‘Insider Threat?’  
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An ‘insider threat’ is defined by Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering 
Institute as “the potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's 
assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could 
negatively affect the organization.”90 An insider may conduct violence, sabotage, and/or steal 
intellectual property/ national security secrets for personal gain, or that insider may be a “spy”—
someone who is compromising information or products in order to benefit another organization 
or country. In some cases, insiders are not even organic employees, just contractors given 
temporary access to the victim’s workspace for a certain job. Examples often include commercial 
cleaning, outsourced security personnel/ technology, or information technology (IT) help, which 
was what Aaron Alexis did at the Washington Navy Yard prior to his violent insider attack.  
While all insiders have the potential for catastrophic damage to national security, not all 
are intentionally harmful. There are two categories that differentiate the attackers – unintentional 
and malicious. There is little research explicitly focused on unintentional insiders, but some are a 
result of carelessness or accidents, which is a non-threat driven risk. Scholars at the University of 
Oxford attempted to address this research gap and their research attributed most accidental 
insider attacks to poor policy management. Their findings show that many incidents could have 
been prevented if their policies were better defined, less technical, and more properly 
disseminated among the employees.91  The second contributing factor to accidental incidents is 
human error, which can encompass negligence, failure, misplacing sensitive items, or a lack of 
training.92  
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In some cases, unintentional insiders are tricked, or are unwitting to their role in an 
attack. Cybercrimes and cyberespionage have made employees a target of their schemes, leading 
to human enabled-cyberattacks. An example of this occurred against the DoD in 2008 when a 
malware infected USB drive was likely left in an unsecured parking lot at a military base in 
Afghanistan. An unwitting and curious U.S. Soldier found the drive and plugged it into their 
workstation, which was in an access-controlled space, and gave the attacker access to everything 
on the DoD’s Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPRNet) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence 
Communication System (JWICS); both are classified networks, with material ranging in 
classification from Secret up to Top Secret on JWICS. This breach was named Buckshot Yankee 
and took years to clean up. The malware propagated throughout U.S. Central Command’s 
systems for approximately 14 months, making it the most serious breach of a classified network 
in history.93 It is unclear (or classified) who the attacker was or how much sensitive information 
was compromised, but the breach likely provided an adversary valuable information on 
operations, sources, or war plans; all offering the enemy a marked advantage they could use to 
counter the DoD’s efforts and take American lives in the process.  
The details of the attack’s origin, in 2008, are not certain, but it is reasonable to assume 
the service member did not mean harm and was unaware of the damage they would cause by 
inserting the drive. This implies that a foreign adversary planned to circumvent the access 
control and security measures by having someone with authorized access (an insider) unwittingly 
execute the attack on their behalf. The attack occurred during a time when bootlegged movies 
and video games were commonly passed between deployed service members on similar thumb 
drives as the one infected. So, the unintentional insider likely thought they would harmlessly 
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discover some new entertainment, not provide an adversary with classified material that could be 
used against them. Buckshot Yankee was a seminal event because it highlighted significant 
vulnerabilities in security programs. The information ascertained from the event likely led to 
intelligence driven security decisions that DoD employees still adhere to, like the prohibition of 
USB drives in secure spaces.  
More sinister than the unintentional insiders are their malicious counterparts. These are 
the insiders who knowingly and intentionally use their privileged access to cause harm. 
However, their motivations for attacking their employer and country often range between 
political objectives, extreme religious ideologies, emotional revenge, and/or financial gain.94 
Since DoD employees have regular access to classified information, their ability to conduct a lot 
of damage to national security is very prevalent. The DoD has been victim to a long list of 
malicious insiders who used their access to cause destruction, most noteworthy include Anna 
Montes, Bradley Manning, Edward Snowden, and Nidal Hasan.  
Insider events are further categorized by the attack itself, most of which are malicious. 
The loss or degradation of organizational resources or capabilities is classified by the National 
Insider Threat Task Force as sabotage, which can involve information technology, vehicles, 
weapons, or anything necessary for the organization to achieve its mission.95 Insiders can also 
conduct terrorism, which is defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigations as “violent, criminal 
acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from 
domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental 
nature.”96 Another insider attack is workplace violence, which shares the violent nature of 
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terrorism, but lacks the external, often political, motivation. Workplace violence perpetrated by 
insiders can include verbal, written, or any physically aggressive threat or attack against others.97 
There has been a lot of research on workplace violence as it seems to be an increasingly common 
danger. Much of the research indicates the insiders are acting out of retaliation and/or suffer from 
mental illnesses.98,99 Theft and fraud are additional malicious insider attack types, but given the 
national security focus of this thesis, espionage will be the final type discussed as it is the most 
common and damaging attack.  
Many malicious insiders use their access to provide foreign intelligence entities (FIE) 
classified information, which is known as espionage and often becomes a far more complex 
game of smoke and mirrors as portrayed in the movies. There are volunteer spies, like Edward 
Snowden, who seek out a FIE due to personal motivations or objections. However, most 
espionage cases involve the FIE taking their time to recruit an agent, or ‘spy’, who uses their 
placement and access against the targeted organization. Like Carnegie Mellon’s definition, the 
Department of Defense Directive 5240.06 (DODD 5240.06) defines this specific insider as “a 
person who uses their authorized access to DoD facilities, systems, equipment, information or 
infrastructure to damage, disrupt, operations, compromise DoD information or commit espionage 
on behalf of a FIE.”100  
There is often a robust recruitment process as FIEs cannot openly divulge their true intent 
to every potential recruit without being apprehended and prosecuted, or falling victim to a risky 
double agent operation. The recruitment of a spy first begins with spotting a potential recruit.101 
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This is where a foreign intelligence officer identifies a target using a variety of means, which 
now often includes social media, like LinkedIn or Facebook, where people often provide their 
employment information. Once spotted, the intelligence officer begins assessing the potential 
recruit for exploitable weaknesses, such as; extramarital affairs, gambling, drug addiction, and/or 
financial problems.102  
The assessment may also include discovering potential motivators using the ‘MICE’ 
method – money, ideology, compromise, and ego, which could be used for coercion.103 If there is 
any indication the FIE can exploit or coerce the recruit, they will move into the development 
phase, which is where they make contact and attempt to foster a close relationship. For their 
approach, the FIE’s fake persona and background is often built in a manner that makes them 
most suitable to foster whatever kind of relationship they hope to establish with the recruit. The 
ensuing recruitment phase is the riskiest because this is when the FIE reveals the clandestine 
nature of their intent to turn the recruit into a spy, but often still uses deception regarding their 
strategic objectives and identity. The final stage is ‘handling,’ which involves the sensitive 
communication after the recruit has become a spy and is now disclosing national security secrets 
to the FIE, which is a national security crime punishable by death.104  
It is extremely important to note that espionage has evolved in complexity due to the 
internet. Each phase of the cycle can be conducted without ever meeting in person, which makes 
detection and mitigation more difficult than ever. Additionally, human nature makes almost 
everyone susceptible to at least one of the MICE factors, but people are protected from being 
targeted by their potential motivators being concealed. Unfortunately, the internet unveils their 
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shroud of privacy and enables FIEs to build an approach plan tailored to their target’s unique 
circumstances; complements of hackers’ ability to illicitly obtain sensitive information, as 
evidenced by the OPM data breach in 2015.  
To reduce the likelihood of insiders operating within the government, there are many 
countermeasures used to prevent and discover them. The first countermeasure is the pre-
employment polygraph, often used by defense agencies before granting security clearances. The 
polygraph is a counterintelligence function, illustrating another example of intelligence informs 
security by determining if employment candidates are trustworthy. Additionally, most federal 
agencies mandate current employees retake a polygraph every five years, which is meant to 
discover if an employee has become compromised and it potentially an insider. Another 
countermeasure provided by intelligence to discover insiders is user activity monitoring (UAM), 
as discussed in chapter 1. UAM is effective because federal employees all agree to consensual 
monitoring while accessing government networks as a requirement of their job. Per Executive 
Order 13587, UAM is required to counter insider threats by monitoring for suspicious activity, 
such as nefarious communications or removing classified information from a system.   
Insider espionage imposes a tremendous cost on the DoD and national security in terms 
of strategy loss, the potential for lost lives, and significant monetary expenditure. However, 
insider-spies do not directly conduct violence against their fellow employees, as they are likely 
motivated for financial benefit or coerced by something discovered in the assessment phase. 
Unfortunately, FIEs are not the only foreign groups targeting insiders; international terrorist 
organizations (ITOs) use similar methods to recruit people sympathetic to their causes. When 
deep ideologies become motivation for betrayal and extremist action, radicalization and violence 
 
 
are likely to ensue. To the detriment of national security, ITOs also use the internet and are 
capable of mobilizing insiders without ever meeting in person.  
In 2009, U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan fatally shot 13 people and wounded 32 others, at 
Ft. Hood, TX, in a vicious act of ‘lone wolf’ terrorism.105 Hasan was a trusted field grade officer 
in the Army, serving as a psychiatrist to Soldiers and their families. His attack was religiously 
motivated, yet his cousin described him as less of a devout Muslim at one time, who more so 
practiced his faith culturally.106 However, life circumstances prompted a religious intensification 
that radicalized and motivated him to kill his fellow Soldiers, making him a malicious and 
extremely violent insider.  
Hasan’s radical departure from peaceful religious beliefs is likely attributed to three 
major factors, which played out in a linear progression.107,108 The first being family; Hasan’s 
mother died in 2001 and he was worried that her spiritual life, while alive, would not earn her 
soul a place in heaven. She began practicing Islam more devoutly in the later years of her life, 
but Hasan was most concerned because she, and his father, owned a convenience store that sold 
alcohol, which is forbidden by Islam. To redeem his mother, he believed any ‘good actions’ he 
did on her behalf would outweigh her sins, as sort of a “religious karma” he began to believe in 
during the initial stages of his radicalization.109 In pursuit of a more devout life, Hasan also 
began searching for an appropriately pious wife.110 However, no potential spouses ever met his 
standards in beauty or Islamic views.111 His interpretation of Islam was largely derived from 
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researching very radical and intolerant Islamic scholars, such as Sayyid Qutb (the same scholar 
who inspired Osama bin Laden) and Anwar al-Awlaki, who was a known al-Qaeda member.  
The timing of his mother’s death in conjunction with the 9/11 terror attacks created an 
extremely vulnerable time period for Hasan, which is the next factor in Hasan’s radicalization. 
While still grieving the loss of his mother, Hasan’s research pushed him toward a tremendously 
conservative brand of Islam preached at the Dar al-Hijrah mosque in Falls Church, VA. The 
mosque was widely known for its attendance by two of the al-Qaeda terrorists, who hijacked 
airplanes on 9/11, and its preacher, Anwar al-Awlaki, the extremist Islamic scholar Hasan had 
been researching.112 After the 9/11 attacks, al-Awlaki gave a sermon that equated the war on 
terror to a global war against all Muslims, which took root in Hasan. His devotion to the mosque 
initiated an ideological introduction with al-Awlaki that would later play into his attack at Ft. 
Hood.  
Eventually Hasan became a psychiatrist and worked with troubled Soldiers who returned 
from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their stories of horror and revulsion took an 
emotional toll on Hasan as he battled an internal affliction. His work trying to help the 
emotionally battered Soldiers led to an intense fear about deploying, which is an obligation most 
Soldiers willingly accept. In addition to the fear his counseling work instilled in him, he was 
overtly, morally opposed to the wars he was expected to serve in. It was later disclosed that 
Hasan’s sentiment toward the war was evidenced in his writings and decaying relationship with 





Hasan eventually received orders for a deployment to Afghanistan, which was the final 
catalyst in his linear radicalization. The deployment likely accelerated the timeline for the attack 
as he perceived it was a “task from God to speed up his [pending] actions.”113 In the year leading 
up to the attack, Hasan communicated with Anwar al-Awlaki nearly 20 times through the 
messaging function on the mosque’s website. He sought information on when it was appropriate 
to conduct jihad, suicide, and God’s expectations of him. Hasan contemplated conducting his 
attack while deployed, but ultimately decided to execute it in the Soldier Readiness Center, on 
base, because it was a building that he was familiar with; a familiarity gained through his 
authorized and regular access as an insider. After the attack, it was discovered that Hasan felt he 
was risking eternal condemnation to hell if he did not commit the attack, because he believed 
God commanded it. Hasan’s communication with al-Awlaki prompted a federal investigation, 
albeit the FBI’s Washington Field Office eventually dismissed as they could not conclude he was 
involved in terrorist activities.114  
It is noteworthy that the FBI was aware of Hasan’s communication with to al-Awlaki and 
his offers to conduct terrorism if needed. Hasan’s progressing radicalization was also evidenced 
by many papers he wrote where he tied in his extremist beliefs. One of Hasan’s classmates 
commented, “Hasan wore his rigid Islamic ideology on his sleeve and wove it through his course 
work…he would be standing there in uniform pledging allegiance to the Koran.”115 Given the 
evidence provided in hindsight and the fact that the FBI was aware of Hasan’s radicalization, it is 
reasonable to assume this insider attack could have been prevented with better risk management 
and security practices.  
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As a violent insider, Hasan was motivated by religious ideologies. He is considered a 
volunteer as no one coerced him into committing the attack. He willingly sought out al-Awlaki’s 
counsel and followed a very linear radicalization. His knowledge as a military officer at Ft. Hood 
enabled him to plan and execute his attack in a manner that accomplished his goal. During the 
attack, he deliberately avoided areas where his weapons could harm civilians as he believed 
harming Soldiers only was his God’s intent. An external attacker would have likely been 
thwarted by security countermeasures and/or not had the foresight to know the demographics of 
each area as well as Hasan. Instead, he used intimate knowledge of knowing where there was a 
high concentration of Soldiers, who also were preparing for deployments to what he believed 
was a war against all Muslims, making it additionally symbolic for him.  
Insider Threat to National Security  
 
The lives lost at Ft. Hood, during Hasan’s insider attack, represent the tragic reality of 
how varying world views often collide with fatal consequences, but what are the strategic 
implications? Some insiders have the ability to degrade national security on a level many media 
viewers and mourners will never understand. The potential to not see beyond the crimes 
committed is often due to the concept of ‘national security’ being widely ambiguous and based 
on varying perspectives from strategic competitors. Whilst describing asymmetric warfare as a 
counter-balancing of force, David Grange stated, “Combatants throughout the ages have 
continually sought to negate or avoid the strength of the other, while applying one’s own strength 
against another’s weakness.”116 
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ScienceDaily defines ‘national security’ as, “the requirement to maintain the survival of 
the state through the use of economic power, diplomacy, power projection, and political 
power.”117 This definition does not offer specifics, but infers unchallenged sovereignty and 
supports Harold Lasswell’s belief that national security means freedom from foreign dictation.118 
Unfortunately, many near peer threats aim to weaken each facet of the U.S.’ national security 
and insiders play an integral role in that. Economics, diplomacy, and military/political power 
represent the strengths and weaknesses Grange described as tenants of competitive strategy, each 
under constant attack.  
To corroborate definitions and frame the rest of this research, President Donald Trump’s 
2020 National Security Strategy (NSS) defines his strategic vision as “protecting the American 
people and preserving our way of life, promoting prosperity, preserving peace through strength, 
and advancing American influence in the world.”119 To accompany the NSS, the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) publishes a National Defense Strategy (NDS) that outlines how its 
federal organizations will accomplish the administration’s national security objectives. The NDS 
serves as the guiding policy for DoD organizations to adhere to and base their strategies on.  
The OSD’s most recent NSD highlights a numeric “2+3 framework” prescribing the 
strategic priority of challenges threatening national security. The “2” represents OSD’s primary 
challenges; China and Russia, based on their strategic objectives combined with capability and 
will to displace the U.S. globally and their potential impact on national security. The following 
“3” represent the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, and international terror 
organizations/violent extremist organizations (both meaning terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and 
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ISIS, the differences lies in the groups’ global presence).120 Understanding the 2+3 prioritization 
framework is important because it signifies where defense resources are most likely to be 
allocated.  
Each of the 2+3 benefit from having insiders within the DoD. As evidenced by Hasan, 
even ITOs can use insiders to further their ideologies, which certainly goes against the national 
security objectives of preserving prosperity and peace. Through self-radicalization and remote 
interaction, al-Qaeda benefited from one of the Army’s greatest strengths (its Soldiers) turning 
into a weakness, in the name of their cause. The other 4 can impose their foreign influence on the 
U.S. and degrade the way of life mentioned by President Trump in his NSS. Additionally, they 
undermine the U.S.’ economy while simultaneously decreasing global power through insider 
industrial espionage campaigns against cleared defense contractors (CDCs), like Raytheon and 
Lockheed Martin. Targeting CDCs is a tactic used to learn about the U.S.’ equipment and 
technology, for the sake of being able to gauge lethality and plan countermeasures. The 
information FIEs seek varies by each nation’s strategic objectives and their relationship with the 
U.S., which also equates to how aggressively they attempt to collect it. The desired targets of 
defense information of interest likely include all classified information, locations of sensitive 
information, technology, security vulnerabilities at cleared facilities, and personnel weaknesses 
that may be exploited, as mentioned in the recruitment process.121  
Once the sensitive information is acquired, FIEs provide their nation’s leadership the 
ability to make strategic policies and decisions that harm the U.S. and its interests. It also enables 
them to corrupt U.S. intelligence collection, which manipulates and distorts the U.S.’ picture of 
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reality used by senior decision makers to develop foreign policy and plans. The collective 
mediums used to ingest information is known as the information environment (IE). Data flows 
throughout physical, information, and cognitive domains, making up the complete IE. 
Manipulating the IE, in any way, is a devasting form of deception, or influence operations, that 
weakens each state’s ability to allocate resources, plan conflicts appropriately, hold 
unadulterated elections, and distinguish between friend and foe. The information insiders provide 
FIEs serve as pieces of a proverbial information puzzle for the adversaries to use against the U.S. 
Knowing how the U.S. collects information, uses it, and what they are planning proves 
invaluable to adversaries who are likely disadvantaged militarily.  
The outcome of a FIE obtaining defense information can be catastrophic. To counter the 
effects, the U.S. Government has many programs and policies in place for securing it, such as: 
strict classification guidance, robust security programs, risk driven decision making, and cutting-
edge technology. However, the use of insiders to thwart those countermeasures has been 
successful in the past. As a result, many covert operations have been compromised by sources 
being revealed, which diminished the intelligence community’s (IC) ability to collect against 
intelligence targets that saved American lives.122 Special operations missions have been 
compromised, placing American troops overseas in grave danger. Newly created technology that 
was made to create a tactical advantage on the battlefield, and often cost millions to create, is 
made obsolete when the adversaries learn classified aspects of it. Each piece of information the 
FIE gains, is something the U.S. must recover from and mitigate the damage of its effects. The 
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complexity with this is that it is not always clear what information is compromised, or who 
received it.  
The DoD and IC regularly reviews and attempts to assess the full scope of damage 
caused by insider threats, such as Edward Snowden, and those efforts can be quantified in the 
billions it costs to just conduct the review of leaked information. The money spent on the 
reviews does not include cost to technology, operations, or anything else. However, truly 
quantifying the intangible impact insiders have on national security is impossible. The metrics 
used to quantify damage include who the information goes to, such as the 2+3, and how/if the 
information is used against U.S. interests.  
Case Study: Edward Snowden 
 
The infamous case of Edward Snowden releasing troves of classified information to the 
public and 2+3 adversaries perfectly represents the damage insider threats have on national 
security. He used his access as a contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA) to stealthily 
obtain and disclose massive amounts of damaging, classified information to the public and the 
U.S.’ most strategic adversaries. The controversy surrounding Snowden results from him 
presenting himself as a noble ‘whistle blower’ attempting to protect civil liberties, not as a 
malicious insider. However, many in the media seemed to have a vested interest in protecting 
Snowden’s image because  he initially met with two particular journalists, in covert fashion, to 
distribute his illicit information for their benefit.123 However, open source research strongly 
suggests that he failed to report his concerns within the procedures clearly defined in the 
 




Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998, which enables members of the 
IC to raise classified issues in a manner that protects the employee and national security.124 
Additionally, all of the agency’s activities were “authorized by two different presidents, from 
two different political parties, by Congress and by seven different judges, 16 different times,” 
said NSA Deputy Director Richard Ledgett.125 Therefore, this case study dismisses the ‘heroic’ 
whistle blower façade and will use Snowden to exemplify how insiders damage national security 
while exploring potential indicators that may have warned employers of what he would become 
and how his attack influenced risk management reform. 
In 2004, young Edward Snowden was inspired to fight alongside the U.S. Army’s elite 
Green Berets, so he enlisted as an 18X, which is a Special Forces candidate.126 The road to 
earning the coveted green beret is arduous, but Snowden failed out of basic training due to shin 
splints, disqualifying him from ever coming close to the initial training and qualification courses 
the elite endure.127 His reason for exiting the Army is significant because Snowden reportedly 
lied after the fact, often claiming he “broke both of his legs”, using supposed injury as a 
honorable justification for his release. However, shin splints are not broken bones and this 
potentially small lie speaks to his integrity and propensity to exaggerate facts for perseverance of 
his self-righteous image, which has severe consequences for national security later in his career.  
After leaving the U.S. Army, Snowden worked as a security guard at the University of 
Maryland’s Center for Advanced Study of Language. As a condition of employment for this job, 
he was required to obtain a high-level security clearance and pass a counterintelligence 
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polygraph as the language center was owned by the NSA.128 Exaggerating his injury as 
explanation for washing out of the Army was an early indicator Snowden’s character was 
developing as someone who often failed to complete things he started and lie about them after 
the fact. As additional evidence of this, Snowden reportedly lied about graduating high school; 
he often claimed to have earned a GED, but a federal investigation after his breach proved 
otherwise, making his entire enlistment in the Army and future jobs based on false pretenses.129 
For his job application to NSA in 2012, his resume stated he graduated from Maryland High 
School in 2001. However, by Snowden’s own admission on a public web form, he contradicted 
his resume and stated, “ …[he] did not have a degree of ANY type. I don’t even have a high 
school diploma.”130 Despite not even completing high school, he began classes at a community 
college in MD, which he also deceived, while he looked for other jobs. This deception likely 
added a layer of credibility to his false claim about completing earlier education as it is a 
prerequisite.131 Alas, he attended a job fair in 2006 and got a job as a contractor for BAE systems 
at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He worked in that position for less than a year before 
converting to federal civilian employee at CIA. His opportunity and service at the CIA led to 
extensive computer and tradecraft training that ultimately propelled his career in a direction that 
would give him access to the government’s most closely guarded secrets. However, he was not a 
“senior advisor” for the agency, despite his claims of serving in such a prestigious role.132  
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Snowden’s service at the CIA was ultimately short-lived and riddled with employment 
concerns where he alleged discrimination, which began in his initial training. He often reported 
issues regarding “morale and retention issues” to his supervisors, but was dissatisfied with their 
response to his claims.133 As a means of raising his concerns higher and hoping for a different 
outcome, he sent them directly to one of the ten most senior officials at CIA, but again to his 
disappointment. Upon completion of his training, he was assigned to an overseas billet. At one 
point during his time in that role, his supervisor claimed, he "often does not positively respond to 
advice from more senior officers, ... does not recognize the chain of command, often 
demonstrates a lack of maturity, and does not appear to be embracing the CIA culture…”.134 
Despite not excelling in his duties and only serving in the position for a few months, Snowden 
asked to apply for a more senior role within the CIA. Ultimately, the same supervisor who did 
not express a lot of faith in Snowden refused to endorse his application and he was denied. As a 
result, he began another controversy with senior leadership over their ethics and hiring practices. 
It is also alleged that he modified his performance evaluation in CIA’s performance review 
software, which resulted in numerous negative counseling sessions and a fitness for duty 
investigation, which happens when an employee’s capability to perform is called into 
question.135 
Snowden eventually resigned from the agency in 2009 due to alleged moral obligations 
about an operation he observed in Geneva. Snowden claimed the CIA set up a Swiss banker to be 
arrested for drunk driving by local police, which would cause significant trouble for the banker. 







leverage over him, which they would do by offering to use their influence to have the charges 
dropped in exchange for his cooperation.136 This was reportedly an operation to implicate 
Switzerland in U.S. tax evasion crimes, yet investigating international tax crimes is not likely an 
area of focus for the CIA based on a significant amount of open source research and the fact that 
they are not even a law enforcement/investigation organization. While Snowden was only 23 
years old at the time, his allegation of illegal government operations was another strong 
indication of what he would become as none of his moral qualms were documented in any of the 
numerous complaints he filed during that period. It is feasible that his story of CIA wrong doing 
was just another false justification for his exit from the CIA.  
An investigation into Snowden’s Switzerland claim may have identified an integrity-
based vulnerability that would have likely prevented him from gaining the future access he 
eventually earned at the NSA. However, if his claim was true, he could have reported it through 
the IC Whistle Blower Protection Act, which would have launched an investigation into the 
operation in question and likely made an impact if there was wrong doing, while affording him 
protection. Instead, Snowden opted to just quit as some sort of self-righteous act of heroism 
without any corrective action for the alleged ethics violation committed by the U.S. government. 
To support the likelihood that his claim was a falsehood, evidence suggests Snowden’s position 
in the CIA would not have even provided him access or knowledge of such operations, again 
indicating he was a serial fabricator.137,138  
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After leaving the CIA, Snowden got a job at Dell managing computer systems and doing 
cyber security for various government organizations. For Dell, he was initially assigned to an 
NSA contract in Tokyo where he was tasked with defending their networks from China. As a 
requirement of employment, Snowden had to pass an entrance test for NSA. It is widely reported 
that he hacked a database and stole the answers to the entrance exam, again exposing his true 
nature as an unethical cheater. His exposure of government operations was a flagrant security 
violation that should have had him permanently banned from further access to classified 
information, yet open source reporting does not provide any evidence that there was even an 
investigation over the issue. Albeit, Snowden was eventually promoted within Dell and given 
additional access to classified information. This security violation and the substandard response 
perfectly exemplifies a failure between counterintelligence and personnel security.  
Another strong indicator of his compromise was 
later reported by one of his coworkers; he often wore a 
black hoodie with an NSA logo parody, pictured in 
Figure 1.0. The logo used the eagle pictured in NSA’s 
logo, but added headphones and showed it clutching 
cables hooked up to an AT&T cable box. This was meant 
to signify that NSA had a secret interception room in a 
San Francisco AT&T office, which was classified 
information and made his creation of this hoodie another security violation.139 The inference of 
classified information on his sweatshirt was part of the information he later leaked. Had his co-
 






workers at NSA reported his hoodie earlier, perhaps another security investigation would have 
been conducted and revealed enough to seize his access. 
In 2011, Snowden returned to Maryland, where he grew up, and began working on a CIA 
account for Dell. This was likely when he began illegally downloading and archiving classified 
material, but why would anyone do that if they were not a threat? Each time he illicitly ex-
filtrated classified information, he committed security violations that should have prohibited his 
future access, yet security failed to learn of his intent, despite the numerous indicators leading up 
to this point. Eventually, he was reassigned again to another NSA site in Hawaii, but quit in 
2013. He claimed his resignation was a result of seeing the Director of National Intelligence, 
James Clapper, committing perjury under oath during a Congressional testimony.  
Snowden later claimed Clapper’s dishonesty under oath was his “breaking point,” 
insinuating that was the catalyst for him eventually becoming an insider threat. Although, the 
evidence proving he began downloading classified information prior to Clapper’s testimony 
makes that appear to be another lie. Additionally, it is well documented that Snowden was 
repeatedly counseled for his behavior at work. He engaged in disrespectful email arguments with 
managers and senior leaders at NSA, initiated by his inability to pass annual basic training on 
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Service Act just weeks before he quit.140 His employment 
issues at both the CIA and NSA indicate a pattern of volatile behavior and an inability to meld 
with the workplace cultures, likely making him feel like a targeted outsider. Since retribution is a 
motivator for many insiders, it is plausible that he anticipated a hostile exit and began preparing 
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for his attack by collecting the classified information ahead of time, then used Clapper’s false 
testimony as another self-righteous way of disguising his true reason for quitting.  
Snowden’s Impact on National Security 
 
For the explicit purpose of gathering damaging classified information, Snowden sought 
out employment with Booz Allen Hamilton, a cleared defense contractor who performs sensitive 
work for the IC.141 From the onset of his new job, he began collecting and archiving classified 
data that he planned to release. The exact amount of classified information he collected and ex-
filtrated varies, but was likely millions of documents. The information he stole pertained to 
sensitive operations the U.S. government was conducting and the surveillance operations and 
technology used against its adversaries. Additionally, the information included classified 
presidential orders to intelligence officials outlining cyber targets, which included foreign 
government officials and civilians. 142 The information he released mostly included information 
outside of what should be considered privacy infringement concerns for Americans, making 
nearly everything else an additional strain on foreign relations and national security.  
In September of 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives released an executive summary 
after an exhaustive investigation into the Snowden breach. While not a direct impact on national 
security, it is important to note that the two-year long investigation into Snowden’s damage 
likely cost millions of U.S. tax payers’ dollars. The executive summary stated, “Snowden caused 
tremendous damage to national security, and the vast majority of the documents he stole have 
nothing to do with programs impacting individual privacy interested –instead, they pertain to 
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military, defense, and intelligence programs of great interest to America’s adversaries.”143 The 
exact effects on national security from his leak are clear; Chairman Mike Rogers stated, 
“Snowden’s actions are likely to have lethal consequences for our troops in the field,” portraying 
the severity of the leak for service members. Additionally, they provided the 2+3 adversaries 
vital secrets to the U.S.’ success against them. The trove of classified information he released 
went directly to terrorists and near peer adversaries who are now capable of training and 
planning with a clearer understanding of the U.S.’ capabilities, in terms of tradecraft, sources, 
and intelligence methods. “What we’ve seen the last six to eight months in an awareness by these 
[terrorist] groups…of our ability to monitor communications and specific instances where 
they’ve changed the ways in which the communicate to avoid being surveilled or being subject 
to our surveillance tactics,” said National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) Director Matthew 
Olsen.144 As a result, the operations used to safeguard U.S. sovereignty, foreign diplomacy, and 
military power were compromised and now the U.S. must play catch up and establish new 
programs and technologies to regain its ability to intercept terrorist communications.   
There have been at least ten damage assessments conducted by various organizations and 
branches within the U.S. government and mostly all the findings are highly classified. The 
executive summary redacted and released by Congress provides the clearest insight into the 
actual damage. However, Joel Melstad, a spokesperson for the counterintelligence center claimed 
damage has been observed and verified in five categories of information, which the government 
keeps classified.145 Melstad also affirmed the notion that each Snowden-disclosed documents 
compound the damage to national security; most likely in the sense that it exposed tools used to 
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amass intelligence and operations, put U.S. personnel and facilities at risk, and greatly 
destabilized U.S. partnerships abroad.146  
Unfortunately, Snowden’s impact on national security did not only harm the U.S. and its 
interests. Many of the Snowden-leaked documents implicated the United Kingdom and its ability 
to successfully achieve national security and diplomacy. As an example, Prime Minister David 
Cameron demanded newspapers stop publishing leaked NSA files about the UK’s Government 
Communication head quarter’s program that collected signal intelligence on Europeans. This 
specific leak caused strained relations between Germany, the U.S., and the UK as it was 
determined that German Chancellor, Angela Merkel’s, phone was tapped as part of this 
combined operation.147 As a result, the U.S. embassy, in Germany, faced great scrutiny and the 
alliance with Germany was weakened.  
The international relations issues did not stop in Europe. The Brazilian government 
publicly expressed significant dissatisfaction after Snowden’s leak revealed the NSA was spying 
on communications of senior Brazilian leaders. Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, was 
“furious” and demanded a public apology from the U.S. as Snowden revealed that the NSA was 
intercepting her private communications.148 Additionally, Rousseff canceled a scheduled White 
House visit and downgraded commercial ties between the two nations. The Brazilian government 
was so outraged by Snowden’s disclosure that they cancelled a $4.5 billion dollar contract with 
U.S. owned Boeing and gave the fighter jet contract to a Swedish company that they was more 
trustworthy.149 This fractured diplomatic relationship happened at a time when the World Cup 
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was about to occur in Brazil, which likely impacted the coordination of emergency response and 
prevention preparedness for security threats at the global event.  
International terrorists often use commercial services, like Google and Yahoo, to 
communicate their plans. This makes commercial services a pivotal platform for collecting 
critical information used to defend against their attacks. This was another aspect of national 
security damaged by Snowden as his leaks antagonized relations with many large private data 
companies. Part of what he revealed was that NSA programs, used to counter terrorist plots, 
intercepted data from Google and Yahoo user accounts. This outraged both company’s general 
counsel and ultimately caused them to extend their encryption across more platforms, making it 
more difficult for the NSA to collect valuable national security information.150 Additionally, 
public outing revealed a crucial aspect of the intelligence community’s playbook, which allowed 
terrorists to alter their communication methods in a manner that would be more difficult to 
intercept.  
There is a strong possibility that the media painting Snowden as a patriotic hero, instead 
of reporting his true character, could have significant consequences in the future. It encourages 
others who may have ethical qualms about their intelligence work to follow a similar path 
instead of reporting their issues the correct way. Plus, the false narrative that Snowden is a hero 
creates added controversy over the government’s ability to prosecute him and may impact future 
whistle blowers’ willingness to come forward with legitimate issues. In addition to the national 
security damage he caused, U.S. technology companies were forced to spend billions building 
business centers in other countries to regain the trust that was lost after Snowden’s breach. Yet, 
 




this furthers the potential for future damage as operating international business centers puts 
intellectual property in increased danger of being compromised. It is also highly likely that 
Snowden has not yet released all the information he obtained, making it nearly impossible to 
predict future consequences.  
Case Study: Security Failures 
 
Education and employment verification are basic tenants of federal pre-employment 
background screening, making Snowden’s high school deception an oversight that should have 
been discovered. Snowden would have been required to obtain a secret security clearance prior 
to joining the Army and then a Top Secret for his other jobs. For his background investigation, a 
Standard Form 86 (SF-86) would have been completed and submitted to OPM. Per the National 
Bureau of Background Investigations (NBIB), the SF-86 is “is a permanent document that may 
be used as the basis for future investigations, eligibility determinations for access to classified 
information or to hold a sensitive position, suitability or fitness for Federal employment, fitness 
for contract employment, or eligibility for physical and logical access to federally controlled 
facilities or information systems.”151 At the time, the process was managed by OPM, but as 
Chapter 1 indicated, their failures resulted in the creation of NBIB, which combines efforts with 
the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency. It is much more likely dishonesty 
regarding school attendance and completion would be caught under the new process.  
Snowden also lied about being a “senior advisor” at the CIA on his resume to the NSA. It 
was later revealed that he was an entry level computer technician who embellished his roles and 
responsibilities to create a façade of competence and prestige.152 Had Snowden lied about that on 
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an SF-86, it would have likely been discovered, but open source research does not indicate that 
he did. The seam between what is reported on an applicant’s SF-86 and resume presents another 
opportunity for background investigators to identify discrepancies, especially after researching 
the applicant’s actual role with the former employers. For credibility to be established, all three 
checks should report the same information; what the employer says the applicant did for them 
should match what the SF-86 and resumes each claim.  
The NSA has an office of Security and Counterintelligence. There is little open source 
information on the security office, but job postings indicate they investigate security matters 
within NSA. Given their assumed responsibilities, had Snowden’s coworker reported him for the 
hooded sweatshirt he often wore containing inferences of classified information, it is likely he 
would have been investigated by counterintelligence special agents from that office. An internal 
investigation like that could have identified other indicators of his future actions and may have 
prevented the breach by immediately thwarting his access to classified information and 
preventing future privileges. This highlights the importance of symbiosis between security and 
intelligence personnel. The plethora of security incidents and his behavior at work should have 
brought his character into question many times. It is possible Snowden’s case is an anomaly in 
the sense that he slipped through proverbial cracks in the system charged with identifying threats 
like him.  
Case Study: Risk Management Reform 
 
Snowden’s insider attack had a significant impact on national security across the globe. 
Although he has not yet been held accountable by the justice system for his crimes, attempts to 
mitigate similar risks in the future have been implemented. As chapter 2 discussed in great 
length, enterprise risk management became a significant consideration throughout the federal 
 
 
government between 2013 – 2016 when the ISC published an interagency standard for risk 
management to be used at federal facilities. Following Snowden’s attack, the NSA answered the 
need for improved risk management by creating a senior executive chief risk officer position. In 
early 2014, Anne Neuberger was appointed to that position to help stem the tide of mounting 
privacy and civil rights issues following the breach.153,154  
Prior to Snowden’s breach, much less was known about the NSA or its activities. Even 
government officials joked that its acronym stood for “No Such Agency” instead of its true name 
because of the secrecy it inspired.155 However, Ms. Neuberger’s approach to the crisis involved 
increasing transparency as a means to inspire added trust in the NSA instead of the secrecy and 
suspicion it once used to protect its methods; “This is a little bit of a different approach for us 
from the traditional No Such Agency approach,” Neuberger stated.156 She further articulated her 
transparent methodology comparing the NSA to a “black box” and explaining that Americans are 
curious to know what is contained within.157 Therefore, Neuberger’s approach blends 
transparency to garner the public’s trust with risk-informed policies that determine when an 
activity is worth it.  
Neuberger began her enterprise risk management (ERM) reform by first engaging key 
leaders and stakeholders throughout the NSA. As chapter 2 explained, having leadership 
approval across any organization is essential for ERM to be effective at establishing correct 
context, which is step 1 in GSA’s Playbook: Enterprise Risk Management for the US Federal 
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Government. Additionally, incorporating leadership from the onset enabled Neuberger to 
determine the NSA’s risk appetite and blend in step 2, identifying the actual risks.158,159 
Neuberger described the importance of defining NSA’s risk appetite as “critical,” and further 
developed a set of accompanying risk principles.160  
NSA’s initial approach at implementing ERM did not stop with engaging senior NSA 
leaders. Neuberger led 11 working groups of between 10 and 20 employees each that focused on 
security events, like Snowden. The exact topics of each working group meeting are not revealed 
in open source reporting, but they built the NSA’s risk model carefully analyzing each event; 
using traditional investigative questions like what went wrong, what drove it, and the severity of 
the event. Incorporating hundreds of employees into the development of the framework created 
employee-influencers who helped pilot the program from inception.161 Additionally, as chapter 2 
illustrated, the working groups aided communicating ERM’s important to the future of NSA. To 
further open lines of communication about it, Neuberger spoke often at town hall meetings and 
other internal forms of social media, which fostered two-way discussion that was vital for the 
employees’ understanding.162  
The following steps of GSA’s ERM playbook were accomplished through Neuberger’s 
time in the CRO role. Many organizations focus their ERM framework internally, but she spoke 
to the fact that NSA went to great lengths at analyzing the broader picture, to include how 
intelligence operations could impact foreign relations.163 An area that Neuberger did 
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exceptionally well implementing ERM was understanding the balance of “traditional security 
risks” and the new ones created in the cyber domain. Her clear delineation between the two risk 
areas allowed her team to create reliable and repeatable processes that every employee can 
follow.164 Making it easy and identifying the key areas of risk for NSA has made ERM part of 
the “way we do business,” said Neuberger.  
It is unknown based on unclassified information if the risk Snowden posed was 
communicated, not only throughout the NSA, but between all the agencies and companies he 
worked for. Although, since he was able to keep getting jobs and the subsequent access, it is 
unlikely he was ever labeled a priority risk, if it was communicated at all. This highlights the 
need for improved information flow and prioritization because it would enable more 
countermeasures to be devoted to the mitigation, which in Snowden’s case could have saved 
lives and billions of dollars.  
Given the destruction Snowden caused, it is difficult to imagine that good could come 
from his crimes. However, NSA invested heavily in ensuring a sound risk framework is in place 
that can prevent a similar crisis in the future. Neuberger even commented that NSA’s 
transparency in response to the breach is a very new and seemingly unusual departure from “the 
way NSA operated three or four years ago.”165 This illustrates tremendous effort placed on the 
agency to step outside its comfort zone for effective mitigation. Given the increased 
transparency, it is also likely risk information flow has improved throughout the NSA and 
associated organizations.  
 
164 Anne Neuberger. Cyberscoop, NSA’s Anne Neuberger on What Enterprises Need to Weigh When It Comes to 
Cloud Security. (2019) 




Chapter 3: Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, national security is paramount to the American way of life, yet adversaries 
of the U.S. constantly seek to disrupt that liberty through sabotage, espionage, and extremist 
ideologies. Unfortunately, insider threat has become an increasingly prevalent tactic used by 
FIEs to meet that objective. Carnegie Mellon University describes insider threats as individuals 
who use their authorized access to harm the organization. Historically, malicious insiders have 
conducted violence, sabotage, theft, and espionage. However, there are many incidents of non-
malicious insider threat incidents known as unintentional insiders. Poor training, negligence, and 
rushed schedules can all create unintentional insider events, which occur when the employee did 
not mean to create a breach.  
The DoD has experienced many insider attacks that hurt national security, including both 
malicious and unintentional. In Afghanistan, Buckshot Yankee represents a historical breach that 
was likely perpetrated by an unintentional insider. The loss was significant because it 
compromised operational information and it is still unclear which FIE benefited from the breach. 
Edward Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures of an unknown amount of classified information 
represents an extremely harmful malicious insider who conducted espionage and helped U.S. 
adversaries across the globe. Snowden’s breach will lead to billions of U.S. dollars lost in 
technology development and the U.S.’ intelligence capabilities. 
To mitigate the impact insider threats have on national security, there are many federal 
mandates across all branches of the executive. Federal security programs that effectively adhere 
to the mandates and incorporate intelligence can provide more holistic and efficient protection. 
Additionally, security programs benefit from including risk management in their decision cycle 
 
 
as it helps create a risk informed culture. A stronger risk culture likely leads to a more risk 
adverse atmosphere that facilitates interagency coordination as some departments lack authorities 
to conduct investigations that could prevent some of the most damaging insider attacks. Nidal 
Hassan’s attack at Ft. Hood perfectly illustrates this point because the FBI withheld information 
from the DoD that could have led to his arrest prior to the shooting. Unfortunately, DoD was not 
privy to Hassan’s communication with a known terrorist ideologue due to their authorities 
preventing them from collecting on U.S. persons and national security felt the sting of 32 lost 
lives as a result.   
Thesis Conclusion 
 
This thesis articulates how federal security programs can better safeguard national 
security from insider threats when integrating intelligence and risk management. In some cases, 
security alone may suffice, but security programs that use intelligence analysis and risk 
management are positioned to better protect their organization by allocating resources 
commensurate to the threat landscape. The seamless integration of the disciplines also causes the 
program to be more cost effective and easier to scale due to the increased focus and improved 
efficacy. However, it was discovered that integrating the disciplines also requires improved 
integration across executive departments, such as DoJ, DoD, and DHS, based on each 
department’s unique authorities and mission focus. Cohesion between departments has 
historically been a challenge, but could be overcome by a presidential directive and increased 
joint working groups on initiatives that involve multilateral equities.  
Chapter one introduced the importance of integrating the various disciplines of 
intelligence with security programs. For security programs to be useful, they must know their 
 
 
threat landscape and intelligence analysis is required to gain that complete understanding. 
Opensource intelligence (OSINT) collection and analysis is used, but adversaries do not often 
post their malicious intent on social media, making it difficult to find it using OSINT alone. 
Geospatial intelligence is also used, which enables organizations to visually depict their 
operating environment using commercial resources such as Google Maps. Yet, the information is 
often outdated and fails to capture the future intent of adversaries. Instead, counterintelligence 
emerged as the most prevalent intelligence discipline given its internal focus and protection 
objectives, making it the most likely to reduce the possibility of a security incident. 
Counterintelligence is a discipline of intelligence meant to disrupt adversarial actions 
against the U.S., to include espionage, sabotage, subversion, and terrorist attacks. A venue for 
counterintelligence is the National Insider Threat Task Force (NITTF), which enables 
organizations to become more proactive in their defense against insider threats. The NITTF 
significantly reduces bureaucracy and provides invaluable resources that empowers security 
programs throughout federal workplaces and especially the DoD. The creation of the NITTF was 
a result of EO 15587 and built around counterintelligence principles that defend national 
security. Yet, the NITTF’s efforts could still be scaled for greater impact on insider threat 
detection and prevention at organizations with access to classified information across the 
country. The NITTF offers a great service by leading the effort to standardize insider threat 
programs by publishing helpful framework material, but a more hands-on, consultative approach 
would likely yield better security results.  
It was discovered that previous executive administrations also recognized the necessity to 
use intelligence for better protection and national security. The Executive Orders 10450, 12333 
and 12968 all facilitated/required the integration of intelligence for the sake of better security in 
 
 
one form or another. Executive Order 10450 mandated that federal employees must complete 
background investigations as a requirement of employment. This set the stage for 
counterintelligence to be more involved in the hiring process, which likely eliminated countless 
potential employees that would have been security risks, such as insider threats. Executive Order 
12333 granted special collection authorities that extended the power of counterintelligence 
special agents and their agencies they work for. And Executive Order 12968 outlined policies 
that allowed federal employees access to classified information, but stipulated the conditions of 
governance that security facilitated.  
It was no coincidence that the DoJ’s FBI was assigned primacy for all counterintelligence 
matters, meaning other departments also have investigative capacity, but the FBI can take lead if 
operational interest is established. The FBI’s lead role in counterintelligence investigations is 
complimented by their significant contribution in the Domestic Approach to National 
Intelligence, as written by James Clapper, the former Director of National Intelligence. The goal 
of protecting national security is complicated by the need to also protect privacy, civil liberties, 
and civil rights; making the collection on U.S. persons a crime unless the appropriate authorities 
are granted. However, the DHS is responsible for the unified national effort to secure the U.S. by 
preventing and deterring terror attacks and responding to other threats and hazards, as the 
Domestic Approach to National Intelligence makes clear.166 The DoD’s collection authorities 
focus on foreign targets, making domestic collection for their security purposes a joint effort 
between the FBI and DHS, and often a result of their criminal investigations.  
 
166 https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/DomesticApproachtoNationalIntelligence  
 
 
Further study should take a deeper dive into DoD Manual 5240.01, which governs the 
conduct of collection activities for organizations throughout the government. While this thesis 
was being drafted, the appeals court ruled that some of the programs Snowden illicitly released 
to the public were illegal. So, an in-depth analysis of DoD Manual 5240.01 may provide 
additional considerations for domestic collection for national security as it was discussed in 
chapter three, but it is unlikely much more would have been gleaned as it pertains directly to 
security programs.  
Furthermore, studying how organizations can build resilience within their security 
program may be an important consideration for follow on research. Resilience directly impacts 
security as it highlights how an organization can overcome security events that were not prepared 
for in advance, either with stronger countermeasures or an adjustment to controls already in 
place. The higher an organization’s resilience, the more likely it is to defend itself against a range 
of threats that cannot be specified in advance by being able to adapt to the threat landscape more 
quickly.    
This study examined how it could be advantageous for intelligence to be integrated into 
federal security programs, but was unsure how that relationship and implementation would be 
managed. The DoD Manual 5240.01 was very important as it clearly outlined the restrictions 
placed on the organizations in question and highlighted specific circumstances of how collection 
on U.S. persons is to be conducted and by whom. Additionally, it was determined that there are 
no national level intelligence assets allocated to federal security programs that collect 
domestically, making threat intelligence primarily a counterintelligence (CI) function or law 
enforcement activity for the DOJ or DHS, even for the DoD.  
 
 
Chapter two demonstrated the strategic benefits of using risk management to complement 
security programs, as well as how it can influence ongoing security practices. Like intelligence 
integration, there are federal mandates that require risk management be an integral part of federal 
organizations. However, the intent of many of them is to influence fiscally responsible decision 
making, much more than improve security programs. Additionally, risk management is largely a 
function of DHS, as they are responsible for the protection of federal buildings. However, the 
correct use of risk management would aid an organization’s leadership determine the most 
appropriate balance between security and risk tolerance, which must be prioritized and 
communicated constantly.  
Risk management plays into a holistic security model as the identification and analysis 
portions of the risk cycle (steps 2 and 3) are instrumental for illuminating the threat landscape. 
Without understanding the true nature of specific threats, security programs are unable to 
effectively allocate resources. Additionally, in concert with the value intelligence adds through 
red team operations and OSINT, risk analysis can mitigate the identified vulnerabilities that 
create the most risk. When fiscally-minded decision making matters most, allocating financial 
resources to what makes the greatest impact could be the difference between life or death, and/or 
leaders who achieve their objectives with limited budgets.  
As the NSA learned from the Snowden leaks, risk management is a continuous process 
that does not end once an individual risk is mitigated. Instead, organizations adapt and learn from 
risk events to prevent future ones. As Anne Neuberger implemented in the NSA, it takes an 
enterprise wide approach that begins with senior leadership’s buy in. Communication and 
prioritization are also imperative and must not get lost in organizational silos. Instead, risk 
appetite statements should be accessible to employees, as the DHS suggests in their 
 
 
implementation guidelines, and employees need to feel like their voices are heard. To capture 
this effectively, Ms. Neuberger used working groups to include employees at many levels to 
instill the benefit of them all working together toward their mutual goal – risk mitigation via 
implementation of the risk management process.  
The DHS’s ISC and GSA published a plethora of risk management guidance and material 
pertaining to federal usage and implementation. However, few sources were found that indicate 
risk management has become an integral aspect of security management. Even with Ms. 
Neuberger’s applaudable efforts at NSA, it is unclear how much their federal police force makes 
risk management a conscious consideration in their daily activities. Unfortunately, the 
effectiveness of risk management is limited to the employment layers that use it; meaning any 
organization that commits to creating a risk informed culture will benefit when employees at 
every level make smarter, more risk conscious decisions. To enable this, Circular A-123 makes 
the point that organizations should focus on prioritization as a key process in risk management. 
Since no organization can identify every risk, they are incapable of stopping every incident, 
making it imperative to focus on major risks rather the myriad of smaller ones. Intelligence is 
used to constantly discover emerging threats and evaluate the potential impact of existing ones, 
which help inform the priority level and associated response.   
Chapter three discusses the various types of insider threats and illustrates how they can 
impact national security. Insider threats are complex because they can be malicious or 
unintentional, but each kind creates internal vulnerabilities as a result of their authorized access 
to classified information, employees, or assets. In some cases, such as Nidal Hasan, their access 
is used for murder, motivated by extreme religious ideologies. Other insiders, like Snowden, use 
 
 
their access for espionage, which impacts national security because of the strategic advantage 
their breaches offer U.S. adversaries.   
The term ‘national security’ can mean something different based on varying perspectives. 
Furthermore, the research for this study determined national security implies freedom from 
foreign dictation, economic and political stability, and unchallenged sovereignty. As the power 
gap between the U.S. and its near peer adversaries rapidly outpaces most every other nation, the 
competition for even the smallest advantage rages on. Insiders play an integral role in that effort 
as they offer pieces of information that create a broader, more accurate sense of U.S. objectives 
at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  
The advancements in the cyber domain make the exfiltration of data easier than ever, as 
well as the contact, recruitment, and handling of sources. The ongoing conflict in the cyber 
domain additionally creates an opportunity for foreign adversaries to sow civil discord and 
influence internal politics, such as elections. It also makes attacks and insider activity more 
difficult to discover and, consequently, defend against. While on a DoD network, users consent 
to monitoring, yet successful mitigation of malicious activity is difficult because the system 
administrators who are observing are not always savvy enough to discern between malign and 
legitimate usage. This strengthens the need for them to be tied into counterintelligence personnel, 
who are more likely to identify indicators of compromise or insider danger that benefits an 
adversary.  
While the specific consequences of insider threats may vary case by case, most have 
considerable implications on national security. Snowden’s illicit disclosures gave adversaries, 
and allies alike, a means of challenging and defying U.S. sovereignty. In effort to recapture what 
was lost, the U.S. intelligence community and political operatives must navigate an international 
 
 
relations environment complicated by a sense of betrayal and the resulting loss of trust. 
Additionally, U.S. Armed Forces were placed in elevated danger as a result of their opposing 
combatants gaining a better understanding of their plans, weapons, and how to defeat them on 
the battlefield. It is also increasingly difficult to project a sense of power on the global stage 
when threats from within the ranks cause some of the greatest damage; this weakens the U.S.’ 
political standing and makes it more likely a near peer adversary will engage in conflict.  
The very act of a foreign adversary recruiting, or exploiting, an employee of the U.S. 
government, to divulge classified information for their gain is an aggressive attack against 
sovereignty, which destabilizes peace. For this reason, insider threat programs should be built up 
in effort to establish a more proactive defense against such actions. No risk appetite statement 
statements could be found in the open web, but a strictly low acceptance for insiders should be 
included in each DoD organization’s as a result of the potential for compounding impacts. If 
insider risk is considered, the risk can be mitigated using the suggestions mentioned throughout 
this study; doing so is likely to reduce the constant degradation of U.S. power and interest, both 
internally and abroad, and will therefore improve national security. 
There is also little open source information that shows other DoD agencies went through 
as much effort implementing risk management as NSA, which may represent a potential 
vulnerability. However, the fact that NSA’s efforts are publicized could simply be a result of the 
NSA’s need to recapture public trust, while other agencies may guard their risk management 
activity more closely because there is no need to share it. Regardless, it is likely that DoD could 
improve dramatically with their efforts to apply risk management to their security programs. 
Even though DHS has responsibility within government, every DoD security program can 
implement a basic risk management process that will improve their protection.  
 
 
Aside from security specific personnel, many DoD organizations, to include military 
units, have anti-terrorism and force protection officers (ATFP) to augment general security. 
Given their duties, they are likely a strong audience to begin instilling risk-informed decision 
making. These individuals are often tasked with broadcasting threats in their local environments, 
so adding the extra layers of analysis (vulnerability and impact) necessary to provide a risk score 
would certainly garner more attention from the employees due to it then becoming personal. 
Additionally, the ATFP officers could become more versed in NITTF’s publications to improve 
the integration of insider threat programs throughout DoD. This approach offers multiple layers 
of risk integration and combines it with countering insider threat, which increases their 
effectiveness and potential to further safeguard national security.  
To protect national security from emerging threats with the highest efficacy, it is 
suggested that stronger cohesion is mandated between departments through increased 
interagency efforts. Currently, there are stigmas attached to certain federal organizations, which 
are never challenged when everyone works in a silo. Yet, the negativity must be eliminated since 
everyone’s objective is largely the same – protect the U.S. and its interests. Eliminating the 
stigmas and departmental competitions is most likely to happen through more efforts such as the 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and NITTF. The JTTFs are comprised of special agents 
from many departments, who work together to counter terrorism. Increasing the amount of 
interagency efforts would not only foster better personal relationships, but allow each 
organization to share resources and authorities. Doing so would likely equate to more well-
rounded teams and shared equities, which would increase the amount of tipping and queuing of 
operational details between departments that could potentially prevent an attack.   
 
 
Employees within the DoD have Annual training requirements. Some are computer based 
and others require in-person briefings. An increase of insider threat training for all employees is 
recommended to increase the reporting of indicators. As this study illustrated with Snowden and 
his provocative sweatshirt, even the smallest indicators of compromise matter because they may 
help with identifying a threat. The suggested changes to the annual insider threat training include 
more emphasis on potential indicators and the reporting procedures. With that, employees need 
to feel safe about reporting their coworkers for events that are not blatantly an indication of 
espionage or another form of wrong doing. Clearly articulating how the reporting employees will 
remain anonymous and be afforded protection from retribution will likely place them at ease. 
Additionally, the training must illustrate how it is everyone’s duty to report for the sake of 
national security; doing so makes them a hero – not a ‘snitch,’ which is another stigma that must 
be overcome in the training.  
Another way to bolster national security through annual training is to create and 
implement risk management and threat analysis training for security personnel. This would 
ensure that the personnel responsible for the organization’s security, not just the management, 
are well versed in the risk management process. Additionally, it would make them adept at 
identifying and analyzing threats that they may have previously not had the wherewithal to 
consider. Making in annual requirement instead of a one-time training is suggested because it 
would refresh and hone the recipients’ skills.  
The final suggestion for this thesis is a considerable increase to the DoD budget, or a 
reallocation of funds, to train and hire holistic security personnel meant to carry out the lessons 
learned in this study. It is recommended that each DoD organization add two holistic security 
officers, ranks GS 14-15, to their risk management department, purely to integrate the various 
 
 
disciplines of security along with risk management and intelligence. Their jobs would not be to 
perform security activities, but more so review and advise on the organization’s security policies. 
Then they would perform audits to ensure the policies are being executed to the prescribed 
standard, or adjustments would be made.   
These professionals would be well trained and versed in both physical and cyber security, 
and they would be charged with the elimination of the silos each discipline likely operates in. 
They would also ensure the policies are written in a manner where intelligence is shared between 
the departments and used for risk analysis. This suggestion would be immensely beneficial at 
ensuring the various lessons learned from this study are used in a manner that would create better 
security programs. Additionally, it would ensure each DoD organization is making risk 
management a deliberate consideration for their security programs, which has the potential to 
save money while offering better protection.  
It is understood that many of the aforementioned suggestions and lessons learned 
throughout this study would require a considerable amount of organizational change across many 
departments. However, the time and concerted effort invested would result in more harmonious 
synchronization between executive departments and equate to improved national security. This 
could be initiated by a presidential directive and managed by the ISC. A future study could apply 
organizational change theory to assess exactly what areas would need to change for each 
department and potentially generate a change management strategy.   
In conclusion, this thesis illustrates the necessity to integrate intelligence and risk 
management practices into federal security programs to protect national security. The integration 
of each ancillary discipline allows for a stronger balance between security and risks, along with a 
more effective allocation of resources. It also enables organizations to identify whatever threats 
 
 
are on the horizon and meet them with decisive ad deliberate action, as opposed to hoping a 
generic security program will protect against them when they occur. Additionally, insider threats 
are rising in prevalence and pose a significant risk to national security. The adherence to stronger 
integration will enable organizations to defend against them with urgency and prevent additional 
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